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OVERBREADTH OUTSIDE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
JOHN F. DECKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Assume a state legislature, in response to threats of a major terrorist attack in its
jurisdiction, enacted the following flurry of laws designed to identify the sources of
the threats and prevent any such attack from occurring. Immediately after the
governor signed these enactments into law, the State Civil Liberties Union initiates,
in federal court, a pre-enforcement challenge of this legislation as well as immediate
injunctive relief on the theory that each of the measures violates the U.S.
Constitution because it is unconstitutionally overbroad.'
Enactment A provides that it is illegal to "verbally express support for the
policies, views or military adventures of any foreign government that does not fully
support the policies of the United States government." The State Civil Liberty Union
(SCLU) claims that Enactment A chills free speech as guaranteed by the First
Amendment.2
Enactment B provides that any citizen of the State "or other person" who is "suspected in any manner whatsoever of engaging in activities that directly or indirectly
threaten the ability of the State to prevent terrorism" within its jurisdiction shall be
subjected to "warrantless, suspicionless monitoring of his or her activities and communications, including but not limited to any activities and communications in one's
home...." The SCLU challenges Enactment B on its face as being blatantly overbroad in contravention of Fourth Amendment rights.3
Enactment C provides any citizen of the State "or other person" who is "suspected in any manner whatsoever of possessing information that is personally
incriminating" or that incriminates others may be compelled to reveal such
information to appropriate authorities when requested to do so. The SCLU attacks
Enactment C as being a per se violation of affected citizens' rights under the Fifth
Amendment 4 privilege against self-incrimination.
Enactment D provides that any citizen of the State "or other person" who has
been indicted for "any offense that directly or indirectly may have threatened the
security of the State" may be tried and convicted "in a forum not open to the public
and without the benefit of a [traditional] jury." The SCLU further asserts that
Enactment D is facially overbroad when weighed against affected citizens' Sixth
Amendment rights to a public trial and trial by jury.5
Enactment E provides that any citizen of the State "or other person" convicted of
"any offense that directly or indirectly may have threatened the security of the State

* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the superb
research assistance of Chris Kelleher, J.D., Class of 2002, as well as Amy C. Chambers, Class of 2004, and
Elizabeth A. Condron, Class of 2004. The author would also like to acknowledge the thoughtful, constructive
suggestions of a faculty colleague, Professor Mark Weber.
1. Overbreadth simply means a statutory enactment is in conflict with a fundamental constitutional right.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (challenging the language in Enactment A that prohibits a citizen from "verbally
express[ing] support for the policies, views, or military adventures of any foreign government that does not fully
support the policies of the United States government").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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shall be executed by hanging." The SCLU claims that the sanction provided in
Enactment E amounts to a clear violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.6
At first blush, it might be assumed that each of these rather draconian measures
would be struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad. Yet, if one considers the
U.S. Supreme Court's view of the overbreadth doctrine, only Enactment A is a clear
candidate for invalidation under this doctrine. Preposterous? Consider the following.
Broadly speaking, the "overbreadth doctrine" is a concept that courts utilize in
determining if legislation intrudes upon a constitutional right.7 However, the
overbreadth doctrine originated within the context of the First Amendment, and it
has, generally speaking, remained in that context. 8 Indeed, starting in 1984, the U.S.
Supreme Court has even expressly denied that the overbreadth doctrine enjoys any
existence outside the First Amendment.9 Fortunately, to some extent the Court's
actions speak louder than words. There are a limited number of cases in which
various courts, including the Supreme Court, have explicitly used the overbreadth
doctrine, or an analysis that parallels overbreadth, to strike down statutes that were
infringing on fundamental rights other than the First Amendment.'° Though these
cases are scattered and few, enough exist to indicate that overbreadth may indeed
have life outside the First Amendment. This article argues that, historically,
overbreadth has appeared outside of the First Amendment context and, more
importantly, advocates the contemporary use of the overbreadth doctrine beyond the
First Amendment arena.
Part II of this article discusses the overbreadth concept generally and the
distinction between overbreadth and vagueness, because many challenges to the
validity of certain laws involve both a claim of vagueness and a claim of
overbreadth. In addition, sometimes these concepts are confused with one another
and, thus, they will be contrasted. Part III covers the Court's recognition of
overbreadth within the context of the First Amendment and the Court's recent
insistence that the concept has no application where a petitioner's claim is based on
a constitutional protection other than the First Amendment. Part IV examines several
earlier cases decided by the Court in which the Court, in fact, used the overbreadth
doctrine outside of the First Amendment context. Also, it discusses a few more
recent Court cases where the Court flirted with, if not relied on, overbreadth outside
of the First Amendment. Part V first discusses examples of lower court usage of
overbreadth before the U.S. Supreme Court claimed the doctrine has no vitality
aside from First Amendment. Part V goes on to illustrate the extent of the confusion
within the lower courts regarding the availability of overbreadth outside the First
Amendment context as a result of the Court's proclamation that overbreadth does
not exist outside of the First Amendment and the Court's inconsistent application
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (discussing overbreadth doctrine).
8. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1982) (discussing "[wihat has become known as the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine"). Compare Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967) (stating government
proscriptions may not utilize "means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of 'protected
freedoms') (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (emphasis added)).
9. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984).
10. See infra notes 249-501 and accompanying text.
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of the doctrine in decisions not concerning the First Amendment. Finally, Part VI
posits that there is no legitimate reason to limit the use of overbreadth to the First
Amendment and recommends that courts should rely on the overbreadth doctrine to
protect other fundamental rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The OverbreadthDoctrine Generally
A statute is struck down for "overbreadth"" if it "does not aim specifically at the

11. Scholarly treatments of this subject almost invariably offer that it is confusing or misunderstood. See,
e.g., Laurence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 541, 542 (1985) (stating
that the overbreadth doctrine is confusing); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (stating
that the overbreadth doctrine is confusing); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853, 853 (1991) (stating that the overbreadth doctrine is misunderstood). Some deny its relevant significance while
others applaud its great importance. See, e.g., Fallon, supra, at 854-56 ("overbreadth doctrine is far weaker potion
than either its champions or its critics have appreciated"); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844, 845-46 (1970) [hereinafter HARVARD Note] ("overbreadth doctrine is ... highly protective of
first amendment interests").
Most argue that overbreadth is, and should be, confined to the First Amendment. See, e.g., HARVARD
Note, supra; Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1069-70 (1983); Alexander, supra, at 553 (asserting overbreadth doctrine is
meant to protect "constitutionally protected expression"). Professor Redish argues against the U.S. Supreme Court's
view of overbreadth and its reliance on "unbending categorical rules" (e.g., "conduct" versus "expression,"
"overbroad" versus "substantially overbroad") and in favor of "directing the court to ask whether the state's goal
could be achieved by means less invasive of free speech interests." Redish, supra, at 1069-70. Professor
Alexander's overbreadth test would ask "whether and to what extent protected expression will be chilled by the
words of the law and whether such chilling effect is a fair price to pay for the interests served by those words as
opposed to other words." Alexander, supra, at 554.
While most scholars, e.g., Fallon, supra, at 863, agree that the overbreadth doctrine is unique in
constitutional adjudication in not insisting on traditional standing, i.e., that the petitioner is directly affected by the
overreaching legislation, Professor Monaghan insists the overbreadth doctrine is not at odds with conventional
standing principles by allowing a petitioner to rely on an enactment's unconstitutional application to others not
before the court when, in reality, the petitioner's only real concern is that a law is unconstitutional as applied to him
or her. Monaghan, supra, at 4. He posits that "overbreadth analysis is concerned with the substance of constitutional
review; it does not rely on any distinctive standing component." Id. at 39. He states that a court facing such a
petitioner is simply examining the "merits of the substantive constitutional claim" and determining whether the
enactment at issue was "a constitutionally valid rule of law." Id. at 3. In other words, Monaghan is basically saying
that standing is not required.
Professor Fallon believes the "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine consists of two components": (1)
"the ideal of the rule of law" and (2) a "prophylactic" aspect. Fallon, supra, at 907-08. The first component is
somewhat akin to Monaghan's point that a litigant has a right to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally
valid rule of law, which is the litigant's "personal" right. Id. at 868-74. The more sweeping "prophylactic"
_component focuses on the-extent-to which-the challenged-law willhave-a "chilling-effect," the-effect of deterring
constitutionally protected speech or conduct, on the free expression of the litigant or of third parties. Id. at 907-08.
Meanwhile, Professor Dorf argues that the overbreadth doctrine should not be confined to the First
Amendment. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 264-71
(1994). However, he does not believe, for example, that it should extend to the "litigation rights" contained in the
Fifth through the Eighth Amendments. Id. at 269. He concludes that "overbreadth analysis applies only to First
Amendment rights and the relatively few unenumerated nonlitigation fundamental rights, such as those stemming
from a general right to privacy." Id. Dorf believes overbreadth is particularly appropriate in regard to the right to
abortion. Id. at 269-71. Dorf relies heavily on the "chilling effect" as a justification for the employment of
overbreadth, which he sees as valid in both First Amendment and abortion cases. Id. at 265-71.
The idea that overbreadth is necessary to address chilling effect may be fallacious. As Professor Redish
points out, such "reasoning.. .is not premised on any empirical basis, and the extent to which people actually base
their conduct on knowledge of statutory content may be questioned." Redish, supra, at 1040-41. This author agrees.
More importantly, whether such a law chills a basic human right is beside the point because the two concepts
justifying overbreadth explored below are overriding considerations.
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evils within the allowable area of state control but...sweeps within its ambit other
[constitutionally protected] activities.... "2 That is, if a statute's language, given its
normal meaning, is so broad that the statute's sanctions may unnecessarily apply to
conduct that the state is not entitled to regulate, it is overbroad.'3 The overbreadth
doctrine only applies if it "reaches a substantialamount of constitutionally protected
conduct.' 4 A claim of overbreadth must establish "something more than a mere
possibility" that the law may be unconstitutionally applied.' 5 While "substantial
overbreadth" does not lend itself to "an exact definition," there must be a "realistic
danger" the enactment will "significantly compromise" fundamental rights. 16 While
"overbreadth" broadly defined would arguably arise where legislation is
inconsistent, even to a small extent, with fundamental freedoms or rights,
"substantial overbreadth" requires the law in question to be sufficiently intrusive on
fundamental rights either qualitatively, quantitatively, or both that its negative
impact on free exercise outweighs the positive social benefits that flow from its
application to conduct that is constitutionally unprotected.' 7 Also, overbreadth is
only available if there exists no way to sever the law's potentially unconstitutional
I believe two interacting concepts justify overbreadth analysis. First, every person's conduct must be
measured by a valid rule of law. This is different than Monaghan's every litiganthas a right to be judged by a valid
rule of law. See infra notes 550-566 and accompanying text. Second, recognizing that some may not have the
capacity to challenge a law to test its validity, the third party standing offered by the overbreadth doctrine assures
broader vindication of fundamental rights. The reality is that a human condition or circumstance may discourage,
if not prevent, individuals from asserting their basic rights. Whether it is indigence, ignorance, illness, disability,
immaturity, old age, imprisonment, isolation, timidity, or fear, the condition or circumstance may be a barrier to
enjoyment of essential human rights. Unlike the position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court as well as most legal
theorists and commentators, this author believes that the fruits of the overbreadth doctrine ought to be available to
a petitioner asserting any fundamental right, not merely those guaranteed by the First Amendment or, as Doff might
add, the right to privacy. Specifically, so long as a petitioner can establish that an enactment gives rise to a realistic
danger of reaching a substantialamount of constitutionally protected conduct, or that it significantly impairs the
exercise of a fundamental right of his own or those of other parties not before the court, the petitioner is entitled to
facial invalidation of the enactment. See infra notes 560-566 and accompanying text.
12. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1939).
13. Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1984) ("A law is overbroad if it prohibits not
only acts the legislature may forbid, but also constitutionally protected conduct.").
14. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494 (1982) (emphasis added).
See also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,503 (1985); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770-73
(1982).
15. Gannet Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Berger, 894 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1990) (Port Authority Rule that
prohibits the distribution at Newark Airport of written expression "relating to commercial activity" without the
consent of the Port Authority held facially invalid when weighed against First Amendment).
16. Members of City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800-01 (1984)
(municipal ordinance prohibiting posting of signs on public property challenged by group of supporters for election
to city council held not unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of group's First Amendment rights of free
expression).
.,__ (2003).
17. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.
[Tihere comes a point at which the chilling effect of an overbroad law, significant though it may
be, cannot justify prohibiting all enforcement of that law-particularly a law that reflects
"legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." For there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine
when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech, or especially to
constitutionally unprotected conduct. To ensure that these costs do not swallow the social
benefits of declaring a law "overbroad," we have insisted that a law's application to protected
speech be "substantial," not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law's
plainly legitimate applications before applying the "strong medicine" of overbreadth
invalidation.
Id. (citations omitted).
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reach from its proper reach."8 Likewise, an overbreadth claim will not succeed where
"a satisfactory limiting construction" can be placed on the stricture. 9 The overbreadth doctrine has been described as "strong
medicine," to be used "sparingly":
2
and, then, only as a matter of "last resort. 1
Additionally, the concept of overbreadth is unique from ordinary constitutional
adjudication, as it does not require the traditional requirements of standing.2 1
Therefore, an individual may allege that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad
and deprives either himself or herself or anotherperson of his or her constitutional
rights.22 Inasmuch as an overbroad enactment has the capacity to "deter privileged
activit[ies]," an overbreadth petitioner need not demonstrate his or her own activities
were directly impacted by the law.23 Overbreadth analysis permits a claim where the
law "threatens others not before the court" who might wish to engage in certain
protected activity or speech "but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk
prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid. '24 In other
words, an overbreadth petitioner is relieved of the usual constitutional adjudicatory
obligation of attacking unconstitutional applications of a statute case by case
because an overbroad statute "hangs over [affected persons'] heads like a sword of
Damocles," which is a specter not tolerable in the overall constitutional scheme.25
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
[T]here are situations where competing considerations outweigh any prudential
rationale against third-party standing, and.. .this Court has relaxed the
prudential-standing limitation when such concerns are present. Where practical
obstacles prevent a party from asserting rights on behalf of itself, for example,
the Court has recognized the doctrine ofjus tertii standing. In such a situation,
the Court considers whether the third party has sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy
the Art. III case-or-controversy requirement, and whether, as a prudential matter,

18. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) ("[Ejven if there are marginal applications in which a statute
would infringe on First Amendment values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if the 'remainder of the
statute... covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable.. conduct.....") (quoting U.S.
Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,580-81 (1973)). See also Brocket, 472 U.S.
at 501-07 (upholding obscenity law while striking down the portion of the law that defined "lust" in overly broad
manner).
19. Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 3 (1973) (per curiam) (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 408 U.S.
518, 521 (1972)). See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 118-22 (1990) (stating that a state court may construe
statute in manner to avoid reach of overbreadth doctrine).
20. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
21. Id. at 612.
22. Id. See also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112 n.8 (finding overbreadth claim may be advanced where law
impacts defendant or others).
23. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (holding adult bookstore operators allowed
to advance claim that zoning ordinance criminalizing nude dancing restricted First Amendment rights of expression
of others as well as their own).
24. Brockett, 472 U.S. at 503 (holding Washington's moral nuisance statute not facially invalid in its entirety
where statute reached material that incited normal as well as unhealthy interest in sex and statute contained
severability clause permitting partial invalidation).
25. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) ("If the rule were otherwise, the contours of regulation would have to be hammered out
case by case-and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of
the regulation.").
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the third party can reasonably be expected properly to frame the issues and
present them with the necessary adversarial zeal.26

In a fashion, then, "[flacial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not
primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society.... 27
While there are other types of facial attacks to statutes, overbreadth is perhaps the
most dramatic, in that a "person whose activity may be constitutionally regulated
may nevertheless argue that the statute under which he is convicted or regulated is
invalid on its face. '28 Generally, a "facial" challenge means an enactment is "invalid
in toto-and therefore incapable of any valid application., 29 A typical facial attack
is "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,"3 because, to achieve its
desired result, the restrictive view of facial invalidity demands that the
"challenge.. .be rejected unless there exists no set of circumstances in which the
statute can constitutionally be applied.' Meanwhile, a more moderate view of
facial invalidation exists, at least in regard to the right to an abortion, and follows
a standard akin to insisting the statute is a "substantial obstacle" to the exercise of
a fundamental right in a "large fraction" of cases.32 In contrast, facial invalidity
based on overbreadth may render "a statute 33invalid in all its applications (i.e.,
facially invalid) if it is invalid in any of them.

26. Sec'y of State of Md. v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984).
27. Id. at 958. But see Monaghan, supra note 11, at 39 (asserting that in reality a litigant is only vindicating
his own interest and, as such, "overbreadth analysis.. does not rely on any distinctive standing component").
28. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 n.21 (1982).
29. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,474 (1974)).
30. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
31. Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with Court's denial of certiorari). Justice Scalia, in his Ada dissent, was referring to the "no
set of circumstances" test articulated in Salerno,481 U.S. at 748, which upheld the facial validity of the federal Bail
Reform Act's preventive detention scheme. While Justice Scalia is the strongest proponent of this view of facial
invalidity, Justice Stevens has been perhaps its most ardent critic. In Janklow v. PlannedParenthood,Sioux Falls
Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (Stevens, J., Memorandum opinion respecting denial of certiorari), Justice
Stevens ripped apart the jurisprudential basis of the "no set of circumstances" standard. After agreeing with the
"long established principle" articulated in Salerno that an enactment is not entirely void because it "might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances," Justice Stevens insisted the Salernostatement that
a facial challenge fails unless "no set of circumstances" could lend itself to valid application of the enactment was
plain wrong. Id. (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745). This statement, according to Justice Stevens, reflected a
"rhetorical flourish" and, more importantly, "was unsupported by citation or precedent." Id. Justice Stevens
condemned the Salernostatement as mere "dicta," said it did not reflect the true standard of measuring facial claims,
and insisted that "Salerno's rigid and unwise dictum has been properly ignored in subsequent cases...." Id. Indeed,
Justice Stevens said the test had so little integrity that it was not even necessary for the Court to "disavow that
unfortunate language" until such time as a lower court employs this "draconian...dictum to deny relief in a case in
which a facial challenge would otherwise be successful." Id. at 1175-76.
Applying this reasoning to the hypothetical draconian legislative measures described at the beginning
of this article, while each enactment would (hopefully) be totally invalid as applied to any "citizen of the State,"
their possible permissible application to any "other person," such as a foreign terrorist, would avoid a finding of
facial invalidity, unless, of course, the overbreadth doctrine were applied to substantial amounts of activity protected
by any constitutional right, not just free speech.
32. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (state abortion restriction
facially invalid).
33. Ada, 506 U.S. at 1012 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990)
("Even where a statute at its margins infringes on protected expression, 'facial invalidation is inappropriate if the
'remainder of the statute.. covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally
proscribable... conduct....."" (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 n.25 (1982))).

Winter 2004]

OVERBREADTH

Furthermore, it has been stated, although this article will dispute the point, that
3n
overbreadth only has enjoyed vitality within the context of the First Amendment.
This suggestion is based on the argument that the "strong medicine" inherent in the
"[t]he
overbreadth doctrine should be denied in other constitutional contexts because
3 5 and the
expression"
doctrine is predicated on the sensitive nature of protected
possibility that people might otherwise "refrain" from free speech if such medicine
was unavailable.3 6 In any event, overbreadth claims have been considered by the
37
Court in a significant number of cases. These include situations where the
enactment's plain language may outlaw constitutionally protected activity other than
free speech,38 where it delegates to an administrative authority broad regulatory
powers, 39 or where it extends broad investigatory powers to law enforcement
agencies.4n Substantial overbreadth claims may succeed where "applied to statutory
challenges which arise in defense of a criminal prosecution as well as civil
4
enforcement or actions seeking a declaratory judgment.", ' Inasmuch as statutes are

34. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984).
35. Ferber,458 U.S. at 768.
36. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980).
In.. First Amendment contexts, the courts are inclined to disregard the normal rule against
permitting one whose conduct may validly be prohibited to challenge the proscription as it
applies to others because of the possibility that protected speech or associative activities may be
inhibited by the overly broad reach of the statute.
Id.; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) ("[Plersons whose expression is constitutionally protected may
well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application
to protected expression."). See also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) ("The
danger of [the] chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by
sensitive tools....").
37. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432-33 (1963) (finding barratry statute overbroad); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960) (declaring statute requiring teachers to file affidavit regarding membership in
organizations overbroad); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564, 574 (1965) (holding statute prohibiting picketing
"near" courthouse not overbroad although unconstitutional as applied); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
614 (1971) (rejecting overbreadth and vagueness challenges to ordinance outlawing three or more persons from
congregating on any sidewalk); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1972) (finding disorderly conduct law
not overbroad); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (holding law requiring registration of members
of "subversive organization" vague and overbroad); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1972) (finding
"breach of peace" stricture vague and overbroad); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974) (holding
statute outlawing "obscene or opprobrious" language toward police officer vague and overbroad); Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 758-61 (1974) (finding Uniform Code of Military Justice authorization for court-martial for "conduct
unbecoming of an officer or gentleman" not overbroad); Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 2 (1973) (per
curiam) (ruling ordinance prohibiting "menacing, insulting, slanderous, or profane language" overbroad and vague);
Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 774-76 (1977) (holding obscenity statute neither vague nor overbroad); Terminiello
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1949) ("breach of peace" enactment facially invalid).
38. See, e.g., Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1939) (holding proscription outlawing all picketing
contrary to First Amendment right of association).
39. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-95 (1951) (finding municipal ordinance making it
unlawful to hold public worship meetings on street without obtaining in advance permit from chief of police facially
invalid in violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300-07 (1940)
(ruling state statute prohibiting solicitation of money for religious, charitable, or philanthropic cause unless the
Secretary of the Public Welfare Council approves such cause and determines the cause or religion is a bonafide
organization violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendment right to exercise religion).
40. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) (holding state statute authorizing
eavesdropping pursuant to court order but on less than probable cause for two-month period, with no termination
provision or after-the-fact notice, is contrary to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
41. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772-73 (1982) (emphasis added).
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often challenged on both overbreadth and vagueness grounds, this article will now
explore this latter concern.
B. Overbreadthand Vagueness Dichotomy
A preliminary distinction between "overbreadth" and "vagueness" is necessary
before analyzing the scope of overbreadth,42 because some discussions of
overbreadth confuse these two concepts.43 A statute is vague if "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ to its application." 44 A
citizen contemplating engaging in certain activity should be provided fair notice of
what conduct is prohibited so he or she can avoid unwittingly engaging in
criminality. 45 Also, vagueness is dangerous because it permits arbitrary enforcement
of the law, violating the basic principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Without
effective limits on government authority, the state could run roughshod over
individual rights in the name of an indistinct law on the books. Beyond providing
citizens notice of what is prohibited, the vagueness doctrine is designed to provide
law enforcement authorities with necessary parameters so as to guarantee the
citizenry "fair and nondiscriminatory application of the laws," a concept that finds
"its roots in the Due Process Clause. 47
The requirement of "fair notice" demands only (although no court decision
acknowledges this point) that a citizen have constructive notice that his act is
contrary to law; that is, a citizen making inquiry could have determined if his
conduct was proscribed by the statute. While "mathematical certainty" is not

42. For various examinations of vagueness, see generally John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity
and Other Uncertainty in American CriminalLaws, 80 DENY. U. L REv. 241 (2003); Robert Batey, Vagueness and
the Construction of Criminal Statutes-BalancingActs, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1 (1997); Jonathan Weinberg,
Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. LJ. 221 (1996); Francis A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in
American Criminal Justice: Some Latter-Day Adventures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARIz. L. REV. 385
(1987); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189
(1985); Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
67 (1960).
43. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645,652 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("The void for vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines are closely related as a less precise law may necessarily capture more protected conduct at its edges.");
Cispes v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Some commentators have considered [vagueness and
overbreadth] indistinguishable."). Compare City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Wash. 1992) (stating
an ordinance is vague if it "is too indefinite to apprise citizens of the prohibited conduct and to prevent arbitrary
and discriminatory law enforcement" while "[o]verbreadth analysis measures how enactments that prohibit conduct
fit with the universe of constitutionally protected conduct").
44. Connally v. General Constr., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
45. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (holding municipal gang ordinance vague).
46. Id. at 60-64.
47. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992) ("the
vagueness doctrine, unlike the overbreadth doctrine,.. .seeks to ensure fair and non-discriminatory application of
the laws").
48. Cf. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) ("Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal
dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may compel
or forbid."); Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating U.S. Supreme Court
case law on vagueness "reflects the common understanding that the average citizen does not read at his leisure,
every federal, state, and local statute to which he is subject"). See also Jeffries, supra note 42, at 207 ("[T]he kind
of notice required is entirely formal. Publication of a statute's text always suffices; the government need make no
further effort to apprise the people of the content of the penal law... .In short, the fair warning requirement of the
vagueness doctrine is not structured to achieve actual notice of the content of the law.").
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required,49 a statute is void for vagueness if it "fails to draw reasonably clear lines"
between that activity that is illegal and that which is not such that the citizen is
5°
unable to know whether his conduct is governed by the statute.
In addition, a law must provide "ascertainable standards of guilt" that guide the
arm of enforcement.5 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the more
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other
principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."52 The absence of an ascertainable
standard of guilt in a given legal proscription gives police officers, prosecutors, and
the triers of fact unlimited discretion to apply the law and, thus, there is a danger of
53
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of such a law. Consequently, the voidfor-vagueness doctrine demands that these measures provide officials with "minimal
54
guidelines" in order to avoid such arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Overbreadth and vagueness are distinguishable by three characteristics: (1) the
nature of the concepts, (2) the scope of their application, and (3) their different
standing requirements. As to their inherent difference, vagueness pertains to a lack
of clarity in the actual content of a statute. In contrast, overbreadth is present when
a statute's language is so far reaching that it applies to conduct the state is not
entitled to regulate.
The second characteristic that distinguishes overbreadth from vagueness involves
the actual application of these doctrines. While, generally, overbreadth problems
arise in First Amendment cases, vagueness has a much wider scope. The vagueness
doctrine is applicable to all areas of law,55 although the stringency of this doctrine's
application varies depending on the issue in question. For example, laws giving rise
to civil liability are considered with more deference to the state while criminal
measures are viewed more critically.56 Similarly, the Court has noted that if a law
infringes on free speech rights, "a more stringent vagueness test should apply" than
57
if the law carried no potential for intrusion on some constitutional rights. Here, the

49. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (holding municipal anti-noise ordinance neither
vague nor overbroad).
50. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (ruling Massachusetts flag misuse statute outlawing
"contemptuous treatment of flag" was vague because statute failed to delineate the kind of non-ceremonial treatment
that is criminal and that which is not).
51. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) (holding New York Obscene Prints and Articles
enactment vague).
52. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574.
53. Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding Texas harassment statute outlawing
communications by telephone or in writing that "annoy" or "alarm" another was vague). See also Columbia Natural
Res., 58 F.3d at 1104 (stating goal of vagueness is "to provide standards for enforcement by the police, judges and
juries").
54. Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 907 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding Indianapolis ordinance outlawing
"aggressive panhandling" not vague); City of Chicago v. Powell, 735 N.E.2d 119, 128 (111.App. Ct. 2000) (ruling
municipal ordinance prohibiting "solicitation of unlawful business" not vague).
55. See, e.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 453 (1927) (holding Colorado Antitrust Act vague).
56. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (finding municipal vagrancy
ordinance vague); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (expressing
disagreement with majority's finding that House of Representative's rule authorizing Committee to compel
testimony within framework of investigative activity not vague, while stating, "it would be unthinkable to convict
a man for violating a law he could not understand").
57. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99.
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Court's insistence on more precision in statutory language is an example of the
Court's consistent recognition of free speech as a constitutional right that must be
given special protection. Also, a criminal measure not requiring scienter is more
likely vague than one having mens rea.58
Lastly, these doctrines differ in relation to the standing requirement. Under the
overbreadth doctrine, a party whose conduct is not constitutionally protected is
always permitted to raise the First Amendment rights of third parties not before the
court. 59 In contrast, a vagueness as applied challenge requires the movant to have
traditional standing.6' It should be noted that the Court, however, carved out an
exception to instances of facial vagueness, not requiring the movant to have standing
when the statute's vagueness is "real and substantial" in the context of a free speech
case.6 ' Thus, standing rules equally apply to overbreadth and facial vagueness
challenges asserting constitutional invalidity within the First Amendment context. 62
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates63 is a seminal case
clarifying the essential differences between overbreadth and vagueness in which the
U.S. Supreme Court specified how courts are to proceed if a statute is challenged on
both grounds. In that case, the Court reviewed and upheld a municipal drug
paraphernalia ordinance that made it "unlawful for any person 'to sell any items,
effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with
illegal cannabis or drugs ....
without obtaining a license therefore.'"" Plaintiff,
Flipside, in a pre-enforcement facial challenge, alleged that the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad as well as vague.65
The Court in Flipside established that, when a statute is attacked as being both
facially overbroad and vague, courts should divide overbreadth and vagueness
analysis into a two-part test. 6 Overbreadth is examined first, then vagueness.67
Initially, the reviewing court must examine whether the law reaches a "substantial

58. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979) (holding Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act
provision imposing a standard of care for viable fetus vague and stating that the law's "uncertainty [was] aggravated
by the absence of a scienter requirement with respect to the finding of viability").
59. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990) (finding child pornography prohibition not overbroad);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1982) (same).
60. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 88-95 (1965) (holding municipal ordinance
outlawing obstruction or loitering on a sidewalk and another barring refusal to comply with order of police officer
vague as applied).
61. Young v. Am. Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976) (acknowledging exception to traditional standing
requirement if enactment's vagueness is "real and substantial," causing "persons not before the court to refrain from
engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression"). In Young, the Court examined a municipal ordinance
prohibiting operation of an adult movie theater within 1000 feet of any other regulated establishment or within 500
feet of any residential area. Here, the Court was "not persuaded" that the ordinances "will have a significant
deterrent effect on the exhibition of films protected by the First Amendment" and felt the law's legitimate reach
outweighed the "less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between
pornography and artistic expression...." Id. at 60-61. Thus, the petitioner was not allowed to invoke the exception
to traditional standing and was found to fall within the constitutional reach of the statute. Id. at 61.
62. See id.
63. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
64. Id. at 492 (citing ILL. MUNIC. CODE § 8-7-16).
65. Id. at 491-93.
66. Id. at 494-95.
67. Id. at 494.
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amount of constitutionally protected conduct. ' 68 In making that assessment, a court
must "evaluate the ambiguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the enactment. "69 Also, when assessing any facial challenge, the Court in Flipside noted that
a reviewing court must consider any "limiting construction" that a lower court or
enforcement agency has provided." If the court determines that the statute does not
implicate "substantial" constitutional rights, then the overbreadth challenge fails and
vagueness is examined next.71 If the statute neither "implicates... constitutionally
protected conduct," nor is found "impermissibly vague in all of its applications," the
court should uphold the law.72 In other words, if the vagueness challenge does "not
involve First Amendment freedoms," it "must be examined in light of the facts of
the case at hand." 73
The Court in Flipside, addressing whether the drug paraphernalia ordinance at
issue was overbroad, examined whether the ordinance violated plaintiffs "First
Amendment rights or [was] overbroad because it inhibit[ed] the First Amendment
rights of other parties. ' ' "' The Court held that the ordinance was not overbroad
because it did not infringe on "noncommercial speech of Flipside or other parties.""
Instead, it only regulated and licensed "the sale of items displayed 'with' or 'within
76
proximity of literature encouraging illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs. The
Court added that, even assuming commercial speech was targeted by the ordinance,
it is "irrelevant whether the ordinance has an overbroad scope encompassing protected commercial speech of other persons, because the overbreadth doctrine does
not apply to commercial speech."77 The Court rejected Flipside's claim that the
ordinance was overbroad in that it outlawed "innocent" or "lawful" use of certain
items.78
If Flipside is objecting that the ordinance would inhibit innocent uses of items
found to be covered by the ordinance, it is complaining of denial of substantive
due process. [This] claim obviously lacks merit. A retailer's right to sell smoking
accessories, and a purchaser's right to buy and use them, are entitled only to
minimal due process protection. Here, the Village presented evidence of illegal
drug use in the community. Regulation of items that have some lawful as well
79
as unlawful uses is not an irrational means of discouraging drug use.
Following the Court's rejection of the complainant's pre-enforcement overbreadth challenge,80 the Court analyzed the drug paraphernalia ordinance against a

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 494 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 494-95.
Id.
Id. at 495 n.7.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 496.
Id. (quoting municipality's "licensing guidelines").
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 497 n.9.
Id.
Id. at 494-97.
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vagueness challenge." In regard to the facial vagueness argument, the Court in
Flipside stated that the first order of business is to determine if the statute covers
constitutionally protected territory. Ifitdoes not, the facial vagueness challenge
fails.83 Next, the reviewing court turns to conventional vagueness analysis, which
requires a showing of traditional standing." Here, the Court explained that a
complainant who commits acts that are "clearly proscribed" in the prohibition
cannot "complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."85
In other words, a court entertaining a vagueness challenge not implicating "constitutionally protected conduct" should "examine the complainant's conduct before
analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law."8 6 Moreover, when the reviewing court applies the tests of whether the statute under consideration (1) provides the
citizenry with fair warning of what it prohibits and (2) contains explicit standards
that avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application, the court should not insist that
these "standards.. .be mechanically applied. 8 7
Here, Flipside'ssuggestion that the language outlawing distribution of paraphernalia "designed for use" or "marketed for use" with cannabis or drugs could not
withstand a facial challenge. The claim implied that the statute was vague in all its
applications, was contradicted by the fact that the measure "simply regulates
business behavior.... " Moreover, this petitioner's vagueness claim was belied by
the language of the ordinance, which covered "at least some of the items that
Flipside sold" and its co-operator's admission that the business sold items
"principally used for illegal purposes."89 The scienter requirement contained in
the
drug paraphernalia ordinance, which the government would have to prove in order
to convict, dismissed the notion that one might be innocently entangled in the web
of the enactment. 90 Thus, one could not seriously assert that this measure offered this
complainantinsufficient "fair warning" as to its reach.9' Furthermore, regarding the
arbitrary and discriminatory application claim, the petitioner failed to present
evidence of such application. Absent such evidence, the Court concluded that this
concern would be best addressed by reviewing claims of such discrimination, rather
than forbidding application of the law in its entirety.92

81. Id. at 497-503.
82. Id. at 494 (stating that "[iln a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first
task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If
it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.").
83. Id. at 494-95.
84. Id. at 495 n.7.
85. Id. at 495.
86. Id. (citing Graynard v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
87. Id. at 498.
88. Id. at 499.
89. Id. at 502.
90. Id.
91. Id. at497-502.
92. Id. at 504.
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III. HISTORY OF OVERBREADTH WITHIN THE FIRST
AMENDMENT CONTEXT
A. The Court's Use of the OverbreadthDoctrineprior to Schall and Salerno
Overbreadth as a doctrine originated in the First Amendment context in the 1940
case of Thornhill v. Alabama.93 In Thornhill, the petitioner was charged with
violating a section of the Alabama State Code of 1923, namely, a statute that
prohibited loitering for the purpose of influencing others not to associate or do trade
with a particular business.94 His arrest grew out of his picketing during a labor strike.
The petitioner was arrested pursuant to this statute after he was caught loitering near
a factory "with the intent or purpose of influencing others to adopt one of
enumerated courses of conduct." 95 Thereafter, the defendant was convicted and
sentenced to jail.96 Following petitioner's request for review by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Court examined the loitering statute against petitioner's claim that it was
97
unconstitutional "upon its face" when weighed against the First Amendment. The
Court, while not using the specific words "overbreadth" or "overbroad," was clearly
concerned by the sweeping nature of the statute. 9 The Court noted it had been
applied, amongst others,
to prohibit a single individual from walking slowly and peacefully back and
forth on the public sidewalk in front of the premises of an employer, without
speaking to anyone, carrying a sign or placard on a staff above his head stating
only the fact that the employer did not employ union men affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor...."
In overturning the petitioner's conviction, it noted "the danger of injury to an
industrial concern is neither so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweeping
proscription of freedom of discussion embodied in [the anti-loitering proscription].""°
Throughout the 1960s, the Warren Court began to extensively use the doctrine
to strike down laws infringing upon First Amendment rights.'"' In the 1961 case of

93. 310U.S. 88(1940).
94. Id. at 91-92, quoting ALA. CODE § 3448 (1923):
Loitering or picketing forbidden.-Any person or persons, who, without a just cause or legal
excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any other person,

firm, corporation, or association of people, engaged in a lawful business, for the purpose, or with
the intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have
business dealings with, or be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association, or
who picket the works or place of business of such other persons, firms, corporations, or
associations of persons, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring any
lawful business or enterprise of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; but nothing herein
shall prevent any person from soliciting trade or business for a competitive business.

95. Id. at 92.
96. Id. at 91 n.1.

97. Id. at 95-96.
98. Id. at 97 (holding statute "sweeps within its ambit... activities that.. .constitute an exercise of freedom
of speech or of the press").
99. Id. at 98-99.
100. d. at 105 (emphasis added).
101. While the Court may have used the word overbreadth in another context, my understanding is that the
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Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 0 2 the Court reviewed the constitutionality
of two Louisiana statutes.'13 One of the statutes at issue prohibited certain
associations from conducting business in the State of Louisiana if they were
affiliated with "any foreign or out of state non-trading" association that had officers
who were Communist or part of other subversive organizations. °4 The second
statute at issue required the principal officer of various organizations, including
fraternal, charitable, benevolent, literary, athletic, or social groups, to file with the
Louisiana Secretary of State a list of the names and addresses of its members in the
State of Louisiana. 0 5 Members of organizations that did not file with the State were
not only prohibited from holding or attending any organization meetings, but its
members and officers also faced criminal penalties.l°6 An action was brought by the
Attorney General of Louisiana in state court that sought to enjoin the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from conducting
business in the State of Louisiana." 7 After moving the case to federal court, the
NAACP brought an action seeking declaratory judgment and claimed the statutes
at hand were unconstitutional.'0 8 Eventually, the Court reviewed a temporary
injunction granted by a three-judge panel from the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, which enjoined the enforcement of the statutes. 0 9 The
Court affirmed the injunction, noting that the laws were in an area where "any
regulation must be highly selective in order to survive challenge under the First
Amendment."" It went on to note as to the statutes at issue that, "even though the
governmental purpose may be legitimate and substantial, the purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved."'' .
In Baggett v. Bullit,"12 the Court in 1966 invalidated on vagueness grounds a 1931
State of Washington statute requiring teachers to swear a loyalty oath as a condition
of their employment," 3 as well as a 1955 Washington statute containing oath
requirements. "4 In addition, the Court also recognized that the laws were too

first time the word was used in connection with the doctrine I am discussing was in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967).
102. 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
103. Id. at 294 n.2 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 14:385 (1950)); Id. at 295 n.3 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 14:386
(1950)); Id. at 295 n.4 (citing LA. REV. STAT. §§ 12:401-409 (1950)).

104. Id. at 294 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 14: 385 (1950)). The statute also provided that every "non-trading
association" affiliated with an out-of-state association had to file an affidavit with the Louisiana Secretary of State
acknowledging that none of the officers were affiliated with the Communist party or other subversive organizations
and that failure to file or false filings would result in penalties against its officers and members. Id. at 294-95 (citing
LA. REV. STAT. § 14: 386 (1950)).

105. Id. at 295 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 12:401-409 (1950)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 294.
108. Id.

109. Id. at 296.
110. Id. (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
111. Id. at 362 (quoting Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488) (emphasis added).
112. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
113. Id. at 361-62 (citing 1931 WASH. LAws ch. 103).
114. Id. (citing 1955 WASH. LAWS ch. 377, which provides, "No subversive person.. .shall be eligible for
employment in, or appointment to any office, or any position of trust or profit in the government, or in the administration of the business, of this state, or of any county, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state").
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"broad."" 5 The Court stated that the statute's terms, "even [when] narrowly construed, abut upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms." ' 1 6 Thus, the
overbreadth doctrine was clearly thriving within the First Amendment context.
In the 1967 case of United States v. Robel,1 7 a member of the Communist Party
was indicted under a section of the federal Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950." At the time the Subversive Activities Control Act was enacted, the appellee
was employed at a shipyard designated a "defense facility," and his continued
employment subjected him to prosecution under the Act." 9 Appellee was thereafter
indicted for being "unlawfully and willfully engage[d] in employment," with the
knowledge of the directive against defense facility employment of members of the
2°
Communist Party and the designation of the shipyard as a defense facility. The
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington subsequently granted the
appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment based on the "likely constitutional
infirmity" of the section of the Subversive Activities Control Act at issue.' 2' The
government initially appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit but
thereafter made a motion whereby the case was directly appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 122 The Court upheld the holding of the district court on the grounds
that the section of the Subversive Activities Control Act at issue was an "unconstitutional abridgement of the right of association protected by the First Amendment." 23 The Court stated that the Act "contains the fatal defect of overbreadth
because it seeks to bar employment both for association which may be proscribed
and for association which may not be proscribed consistently with First Amendment
rights.' ' 24 While the Court held that the section at issue was invalid because its
overbreadth unconstitutionally abridged the fundamental right of association
protected by the First Amendment,'25 the appellee had asserted other constitutional
infirmities with the statute, including one based on the substantive due process
protection of the Fifth Amendment. 126 The Court remarked, "Because we agree that
we find it unnecessary to consider
the statute is contrary to the First Amendment,
' 27
the other constitutional arguments.'

115. Id. at 366 (holding both statutes "unduly vague, uncertain and broad").
116. Id. at 372.
117. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
118. Id. at 260. Section 5 (a)(l)(D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 provided that, "when
a Communist-action organization is under a final order to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of the
organization 'to engage in any employment in any defense facility."' Id. at 259-60 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 784
(a)(1)(D)).
119. Id. at 260.
120. Id. at 260-61.
121. Id. at 261.
122. Id.
123. Id. The appellee also asserted that the statute violated substantive and procedural due process, contained
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Defense, and was a bill of attainder. Id. n.5.
124. Id. at 266.
125. ld.
126. Id. at261 n.5.
127. Id. Although the Court ultimately based its decision on the First Amendment claim, it is noteworthy that
the Court also mentioned its earlier decision of Green v. McElroy, wherein it had recognized "the right to hold
specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference
comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 265 n. 11 (quoting Green v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)).
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Of course, not every allegation of First Amendment overbreadth has succeeded.
The Court has been determined to distinguish which First Amendment claims are
actually worthy of overbreadth doctrine application. 2 ' Through a selective analysis,
the Court has exhibited a reluctance to utilize this doctrine. For example, in 1968,
the Court, in Cameron v. Johnson,129 rejected an overbreadth claim brought by civil
rights organizations that contested a Mississippi statute prohibiting, among other
things, engaging in "picketing or mass demonstrations in such a manner as to
obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any public
premises,... courthouses... or other public buildings.... "13' The overbreadth argument
centered on the assertion that the proscription of the statute embraced picketing
employed as a vehicle for constitutionally protected protest.' 3 ' However, the Court
found that the statute was "a valid law dealing with conduct subject to regulation so
as to vindicate important interests of society and.. .the fact that free speech is
2
intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection."'1
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,'33 the U.S. Supreme Court considered and rejected
another First Amendment overbreadth claim. 34 In Broadrick,two paragraphs of the
Oklahoma Merit System of Personnel Administration Act, 135 which restricted
political activity of the state's civil servants, were challenged as unconstitutional on
their face. 136 Appellants, three state employees, sought to have these portions of the
Act held unconstitutional based on First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness
grounds, arguing that these paragraphs of the Act failed to "distinguish between
conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted."'137 The federal
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma rejected the appellants' claims
and upheld the sections of the Act at issue. 138 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed, finding
the sections were not overbroad or vague in light of the First
39
Amendment. 1
The Court premised its analysis by recognizing that the "First Amendment needs
breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First
Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn .... , The Court went on to state that
128. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (rejecting First Amendment overbreadth
challenge).
129. 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
130. Id. at 612 n. I (quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 2318.5 (1966)).
131. Id. at 616-17.
132. Id. (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965)).
133. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
134. Id. at 615-16.
135. Id. at 603-06, citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (1959):
Paragraph six, one of the contested portions, provides that "[n]o employee in the classified
service... shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting
or receiving any assessment.. or contribution for any political organization, candidacy or other
political purpose." Paragraph seven, the other challenged paragraph, provides that no such
employee "shall be a member of any national, state or local committee of a political party, or an
officer or member of a committee of a partisan political club, or a candidate for nomination or
election to any paid public office."

136. Id. at 602.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 607.
Id. at 602.
Id.
Id. at 611.
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traditional rules of standing do not apply to First Amendment rights and that
litigants may challenge a statute regardless of whether their rights of free expression
are violated or anotherindividual's rights may be violated. 14'The Court continued,
"Such claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate 'only spoken words."" 4 2 The Court acknowledged that overbreadth attacks have been permitted "where the Court thought the
rights of association were ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep, might
result in burdening innocent associations."' 143 The Court further noted that overbreadth claims could be entertained where legislation regulates time, place, and
manner of expressive or communicative conduct. 44 However, in very forceful
language, the Court stated, "Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner
is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court sparingly and
only as a last resort."'45 Finally, the Court added an additional caveat: "overbreadth
has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on
the challenged statute."'" The Court, in rejecting the appellant's First Amendment
overbreadth claims, observed, "particularly where conduct and not merely speech
is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
14
substantialas well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 1
Here, the Oklahoma statutory scheme "seeks to regulate political activity in an evenhanded and neutralmanner,"' 14 ' restricts "partisan political conduct only,' ' 49 and, as
such, is best left to case-by-case review of possible improper application. 50
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, then, clearly reflected the Court's determination to not
extend the overbreadth doctrine to statutes that involve conduct-related activities.' 5'
Also, Broadrick is an example of how the Court rejects usage of the doctrine even
in connection with certain First Amendment claims, unless they fit within the tight
parameters the Court has developed.' 52
Likewise, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 53 the Court in 1977 rejected an
overbreadth claim filed by attorneys contesting an Arizona State Supreme Court
disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from advertising in newspapers or other
media. 4The attorneys were charged in a complaint filed by the state bar's president
based upon a newspaper advertisement placed by the attorneys for their "legal
clinic," stating that they were offering "legal services at very reasonable fees" and
listing their fees for certain services, namely, uncontested divorces, uncontested

141. Id. at 612.
142. Id. (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
143. Id. (citing Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
144. Id. at 612-13 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
145. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 616.
149. Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 615-16.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
154. Id. at 355 (citing ARIz. SuP. CT. R. 29).
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adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and changes of names.'55 The Court upheld
the conclusion of a bar committee that appellants had violated the rule, having
rejected the attorneys' claims that the rule was overbroad and infringed their First
Amendment rights.'56 The Court found that "the justification for the application of
overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context."'5 7
The Court further noted that there are "'commonsense differences' between
commercial speech and other varieties. Since advertising is linked to commercial
well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being
crushed by overbroad regulation."' 58 Moreover, the Court concluded that "concerns
for uncertainty in determining the scope of protection are reduced; the advertiser
seeks to disseminate information about a product or service that he provides, and
presumably he can determine more readily than others whether his speech is truthful
and protected."' 59
One oft-cited study of overbreadth in the realm of the First Amendment concludes that "overbreadth scrutiny" varies depending on the type of enactment that
is under review. 6" First, there are "censorial" measures, which "operate to burden
the advocacy of definable viewpoints on matters of public concern," a category
where the Court has exhibited the "most energetic use" of the overbreadth concept. 16' The federal Subversive Activities Control Act struck down in Robel,
discussed above, is an example. 62 Next, "inhibitory" enactments, which restrict
"expressive and associational conduct but whose impact tends to be neutral
as to
viewpoints sought to be advocated," are the second most likely candidates for
64
invalidation under the doctrine. 63 The case of Plummer v. City of Columbus,'
where the Court ruled overbroad a municipal ordinance that outlawed "menacing,
insulting, slanderous, or profane language," could fit into this grouping. 65 Finally,
there are "remedial" laws, which restrict the reach of the First Amendment "for the
66
purpose of promoting values which are within the concern of the amendment."'1
Here, the Court has a tendency to "adopt avoidance techniques and to employ less
than stringent tests of overbreadth. ,,.67
The legislation restricting the partisan
political activities of public employees examined and upheld in Broadrick,discussed
68
above, is an illustration of this type of law.

155. Id. at 354-56.
156. Id. at 380-84.
157. Id. at 380.
158. Id. at 380-81 (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n. 24 (1976)
(citation omitted). See also id. at 775-81 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
159. Id. at 381.
160. HARVARD Note, supra note 11, at 918-21.
161. Id. at 918-19.
162. See supra notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
163. HARVARD Note, supra note 11, at 918-20.
164. 414 U.S. 2 (1973) (per curiam).
165. Id. at 2-3.
166. HARVARD Note, supra note 11, at 918-21.
167. Id. at 920.
168. See supra notes 132-151 and accompanying text.
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As these cases illustrate, the overbreadth doctrine was used relatively often in the
First Amendment context throughout the Warren years. 6 9 The cases that follow
trace the evolution of the Court's insistence that the overbreadth doctrine has no life
outside the First Amendment arena.
B. The Court's Insistence That OverbreadthIs Limited to the FirstAmendment
Whether the Court was influenced by a number of scholarly writings suggesting
that the use of overbreadth was limited to the First Amendment, 7 ° or whether it was
influenced by the significant volume of Court cases prior to 1984 that dealt with
overbreadth only in the First Amendment context, or both, the Court insisted on
beginning in 1982,
limiting the use of overbreadth to the First Amendment context
172
cases: New York v. Ferber,17 1 Schall v. Martin,
in a series of U.S. Supreme Court
173
and United States v. Salerno.
1. New York v. Ferber
In New York v. Ferber,1 74 the Court first referred to a "First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine"'175 when it reviewed the constitutionality of a New York
statute that criminalized "knowingly promoting sexual performances by children
under the age of 16."' 76 Defendant, an owner of a bookstore specializing in "sexually
oriented products," was prosecuted and convicted under the statute after he sold, to
an undercover police officer, two films depicting young boys masturbating. 177 The
New York Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction after deciding that the
law at issue was overbroad because it "prohibited the distribution of materials
produced outside the State, as well as materials, such as medical books and
educational sources, which 'deal with adolescent sex in a realistic but nonobscene
manner."' 178
However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision by the New York Court
of Appeals, holding that the law at issue was "not substantially overbroad."'' 79 First,
the Court concluded that the law, which prohibited works visually depicting sexual
conduct by children below a certain age, did not restrict the production and distribu-

169. Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372
(1964); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616-17 (1968);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,614-15 (1973); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977).
Chief Justice Earl Warren presided over the U.S. Supreme Court between October 5, 1953, and June 23, 1969.
170. See, e.g., HARVARD Note, supra note 11.
171. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
172. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
173. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
174. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
175. Id. at 768-69 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 749-52 ("A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the
character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by
a child less than sixteen years of age." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980)). "Sexual performance" was
defined as including any sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.00(1)
(McKinney 1980).
177. 458 U.S. at 751-52.
178. Id. at 752-53 (quoting People v. Ferber, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526 (N.Y. 1981)).
179. Id. at 774.
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tion of material protected by the First Amendment.1 80 Then, the Court considered
whether the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it curtailed the distribution of material with "serious literary, scientific or educational value" or material
8
that does not threaten to cause the harms that the law was aimed at preventing.' '
The Court observed that the "traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may
constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the
Court" 82 but expressly ruled that "[w]hat has come to be known as the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine is one of the few exceptions to this
principle.... ""3 The Court pointed out that "the doctrine is predicated on the sensitive nature of protected expression: 'persons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions
by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression."" 84 Here, however,
the New York child pornography stricture, "whose legitimate reach dwarfs its
arguably impermissible applications," was not substantially overbroad, and "whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis.... "85
In any event, although in a majority of the cases prior to New York v. Ferberthe
Court used overbreadth to strike down statutes based on First Amendment grounds,
Ferber is significant in expressly labeling the concept as "the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine," which later Court decisions rely on to explicitly insist on
limiting the use of overbreadth to the First Amendment context.'86
2. Schall v. Martin
In Schall v. Martin,1 7 the Court expressly limited the use of overbreadth to the
First Amendment.18 In Schall, the Court reviewed a section of the New York
Family Court Act, which "authorizes pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquent based on a finding that there is a 'serious risk' that the child 'may before the
return date commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a
crime."", 189 Appellees brought suit in federal district court on behalf of juveniles
detained pursuant to the provision." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision that struck down the section of the Act that was
challenged and held that the provision was "unconstitutional as to all juveniles"
inasmuch as the statute was applied in such a manner that "the detention period
serves as punishment imposed without proof of guilt established according to the

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
a criminal
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 764-66.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Viii. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)).
Id. at 773-74 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,615-16 (1973)).
See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984) ("(O]utside the limited First Amendment context,
statute may not be attacked as overbroad.") (citing Ferber,458 U.S. 747).
467 U.S. 253 (1984).
Id.at268n.18.
Id. at 255 (quoting N.Y. JUD. LAW § 320.5 (McKinney 1983)).
Id. at 255-56.
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requisite constitutional standard."'' Notwithstanding, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals ruling and concluded that preventive detention under
the Family Court Act served a legitimate state interest and satisfied due process
requirements. 92
'
Among other arguments, appellees asserted that the pertinent section of the New
York enactment was overbroad because it did not limit the categories of crimes that
detained juveniles must be accused of having committed or being likely to commit
in the future.' 93 The Court did not accept the appellees overbreadth claim and noted,
"discretion to delimit the categories of crimes.. .resides wholly with the state
legislatures."' 94 The Court further stated,
More fundamentally, this sort of attack on a criminal statute must be made on
a case-by-case basis ....
The Court will not sift through the entire class to
determine whether the statute was constitutionally applied in each case. And,
Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be
outside the limited First
95
attacked as overbroad.1

It is noteworthy that the dissent in Schall, written by Justice Marshall, found the
preventive detention section of the New York Family Control Act problematic
because the section "is not limited to classes of juveniles whose past conduct
suggests that they are substantially more likely than average juveniles to misbehave
in the immediate future."' 96 The dissent observed that the juvenile preventive
detention statute authorized the detention of juveniles for "trivial offenses" instead
of limiting it to "dangerous" offenses or "crimes of violence."' 97 After pointing out
the majority's assertion that the appellees asserted their claim "too broadly" by
insisting the statute was invalid "on its face" rather than by challenging detentions
on a "case-by-case basis," the dissent responded by saying case-by-case scrutiny
really amounted to no scrutiny at all.' 98 Specifically, the dissent indicated, "by the
time the suit could be considered, it would have been rendered moot by the
99
juvenile's release or long-term detention pursuant to a delinquency adjudication." 1
Also, "no individual detainee would be able to demonstrate that he would have
abided by the law had he been released. In other words, no configuration of circumstances would enable a juvenile to establish that he fell into the category of persons
unconstitutionally detained rather than the category constitutionally detained."' "°
Alluding to the liberal standing rules available in facial attacks on legislation, "under
current doctrine pertaining to the standing of an individual victim of allegedly
unconstitutional conduct to obtain an injunction against repetition of that behavior,
it is far from clear that an individual detainee would be able to obtain an equitable
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
three-card
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 256 (quoting Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F. 2d 365, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1982).
ld. at 256-57.
Id. at 268 n.18.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 295 n.21. For example, fifteen-year-old Tyrone Parson was arrested for enticing others to play
monte. Id. After being detained for five days, the petition against him was dismissed. Id.
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
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remedy" similar to those extended to petitioners successfully pursuing facial
challenges of overbroad strictures." 1 Here, then, the dissent was implicitly making
a case for recognition of facial overbreadth in a case having nothing to do with the
First Amendment.0 2
3. United States v. Salerno
Three years later, the Court in United States v. Salerno 2 3 insisted, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment., 2 4 In Salerno, the defendants were arrested for various RICO
(Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) 2 15 violations and then detained
before trial upon the federal district court's grant of a pretrial preventive detention
motion made by the prosecutors.20 6 The defendants challenged the pretrial detention
statute,20 7 claiming the Bail Reform Act's preventive detention provision was
"unconstitutional on its face" to the extent that it allowed the pretrial detention of
arrestees based on the likelihood of committing future crimes.20 8 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the section of the Bail Reform Act
that authorized the "pretrial detention [on the ground of future dangerousness]
repugnant to the concept of substantive due process, which ... prohibits the total
deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future crimes. ' '209
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and found that the statute was not "facially"
unconstitutional contrary to due process.2 " The Court insisted a typical facial attack,
aside from those based on overbreadth, "must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid."2 t ' The Court, citing Schall v. Martin,
noted, "The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under
some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid,
since we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context
of the First Amendment. ' 21 2 Comparing the breadth of the statute upheld in Schall,
the Court remarked, "The Bail Reform Act, in contrast, narrowly focuses on a
particularly acute problem in which the Government interests are overwhelming.
The Act operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a specific category
of extremely serious offenses. '2 13
If one took these excerpts in Ferber, Schall, and Salerno at face value, there
would be little need for further discussion of the true and appropriate reach of the

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 299-300.
See supra note 188.
481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 743 (referring to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962).
Id. at 743-44.

207. Id. at 741 ("The Bail Reform Act of 1984.. .allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if
the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions
'will reasonably assure...the safety of any other person and the community."' (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3141)).
208. Id. at 744.
209. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1986)).
210. Id. at 745, 752.
211. Id. at 745.
212. Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 n.18 (1984)).
213. Id. at 750.
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overbreadth doctrine. t4 It seems quite clear that these pronouncements, standing
alone, would leave little doubt that the Court not only does not currently recognize
an overbreadth doctrine outside the free speech context, but that it never has. Some
would say the Court's reluctance to use the doctrine in other situations makes
judicial sense because the overbreadth doctrine originated in the First Amendment
inasmuch as "First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.... ,,15 On
the other hand, it might be said that there are other constitutional 2t6contexts that
deserve the same protection the facial overbreadth doctrine provides.
4. Other Decisions by the Court Rejecting Overbreadth Claims
There are additional cases in which the Court rejected overbreadth claims outside
the scope of the First Amendment. In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
business
Hoffman Estates,2 7 discussed earlier,1 8 the plaintiff, Flipside, was a2retail
9 After being
accessories.
smoking
that sold a variety of merchandise including
notified by the village attorney that it was in violation of the ordinance, Flipside
filed a suit and argued that a village ordinance requiring businesses to obtain a
license if they sold any items that are "designed or marketed for use with illegal
220
cannabis or drugs" was overbroad. When this matter reached the Court, it
immediately declared any claims that this ordinance amounted to prior restraint of
speech contrary to the First Amendment or was unconstitutionally overbroad
' 22
amounted to "arguments [that] do not long detain us." ' First, only commercial
speech was involved, and second, "the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to
commercial speech. 222
Plaintiff asserted the alternative argument that the ordinance was overbroad
because "it could extend to 'innocent' and 'lawful' uses of items as well as uses with
illegal drugs. '223 The Court rejected this argument while pointing out the plaintiff
224
was confusing the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. The Court insisted that
"[i]f Flipside is objecting that it cannot determine whether the ordinance regulates
214. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1982); SchaU, 467 U.S. at 269 n.18; Salerno, 481 U.S. at
745.
215. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
216. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting that beyond the rights explicitly stated
in the Bill of Rights, the Court has recognized other liberties within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process, namely (1) the right to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); (2) the right to have
children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); (3) the right to "direct the education and
upbringing of one's children," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); (4) the fight to marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); (5) the fight to use
contraceptives, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); (6) the right to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952); (7) the right to abortion, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
and (8) the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
217. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
218. See supra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
219. Id. at491.
220. Id. at 492-93. The plaintiff in this case also argued that the statute was vague. Id. at 491. The Court
rejected this plaintiff's claim. Id. The Court's analysis regarding this determination was discussed in detail at supra
notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
221. Id. at 495-96.
222. Id. at 496-97.
223. Id. at 497 n.9.
224. Id.
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items with some lawful uses, then it is complaining of vagueness," not
overbreadth. 2 5 The Court further asserted that, if Flipside were claiming that the
ordinance outlawed innocent uses of items governed by the ordinance, it was
alleging a denial of substantive due process. 226 According to the Court, such a claim
lacked merit because a retailer's right to sell smoking devices and a purchaser's right
to buy and use such items enjoy limited due process protection.227 Furthermore, the
Court felt that restricting the sale, purchase, and use of such items was a rational
means of deterring drug use.228
Another case that rejected application of the overbreadth doctrine outside the area
of First Amendment free expression was City of Chicago v. Morales.229 In Morales,
the constitutionality of a municipal gang loitering ordinance was challenged on
various grounds including that it was overbroad. 2 ' The ordinance defined
"loitering" to mean "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose. ' 231 When
the Court reviewed the statute, it was ruled unconstitutional on vagueness
grounds.232 In Justice Stevens' lead opinion, he stated that
the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have expressly
identified this "right to remove from one place to another according to
inclination" as "an attribute of personal liberty" protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, it is apparent that an individual's decision to remain in a public place of
his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside
frontiers that is "a part of our heritage"....233
This statement, with which only Justices Souter and Ginsburg would join, turned
out to be mere dictum as Stevens continued, "There is no need, however, to decide
whether the impact of the Chicago ordinance on the constitutionally protected
liberty alone would suffice to support a facial challenge under the overbreadth
doctrine. 234 Instead, Justice Stevens felt that "the vagueness of this enactment
makes a facial challenge appropriate. '235 While agreeing with the lower Illinois
courts
that the ordinance is invalid on its face, we do not rely on the overbreadth
doctrine. We agree with the city's submission that the law does not have a
sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment to
render it unconstitutional. The ordinance does not prohibit speech
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citations omitted).
229. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
230. The Illinois appellate court ruled that the statute was unconstitutionally vague: impairing citizens' First
Amendment right to assembly, criminalizing status rather than conduct, and jeopardizing Fourth Amendment rights.
Id. at 50 (citing City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 38 (11. App. Ct. 1995).
231. Id. at 51 n.14 (quoting Cm. MUNIC. CODE § 8-4-015 (c)(1) (1992)).
232. Id. at 64.
233. Id. at 53-54 (citations omitted).
234. Id. at 55 (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,515-17 (1964) (addressing right to travel);
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 82-83 (1976) (discussing abortion); Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 n.3, n.9 (1983)).
235. Id.
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[nor].. .prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a

message.236

Thus, because the ordinance provided "too much discretion" to police authority and
"too little notice" to the citizenry to determine what constituted having "no apparent
purpose," the Court limited its invalidation of the enactment to the concern of
vagueness.2 37
B. Post-Schall and Salerno Decisions consideringFirstAmendment Claims
Not surprisingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has continued to exhibit its willingness
to rely upon the overbreadth doctrine where the reach of a proscription falls within
the scope of the First Amendment. 238 For example, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
239
the Court considered whether certain provisions of the Child
Coalition,
of
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) abridged the freedom of speech 24
pornography. 0
child
"'virtual
of
distribution
and
production
the
in
those involved
The CPPA extended federal prohibitions against child pornography to outlaw
sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors but were produced without
using any real children.24 ' Affected businesses sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in a pre-enforcement challenge.242 The federal District Court for the Northern
District of California dismissed the overbreadth claim, believing "it was 'highly
unlikely' that any adaptations of sexual works like 'Romeo and Juliet,' will be
treated as 'criminal contraband.' ' 243 However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, determining that "the Government could not prohibit speech
244
because of its tendency to persuade viewers to commit illegal acts." The appellate
court held "the CPPA to be substantially overbroadbecause it bans material that are
neither obscene nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v.
Ferber.... 24 5 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the enactment "abridges the
'' 2
freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech. 1 Unlike true child
pornography, virtual child pornography "records no crime and creates no victims by
its production. 247 The interest in protecting children from accessing such materials
or the concern that it whets the appetite of pedophiles did not justify limiting the
236. Id. at 52-53.
237. Id. at 64.
238. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003) (finding that although Virginia's prohibition
against cross-burning with intent to intimidate is not overbroad, statutory provision as interpreted by the jury
instruction stating that burning a cross in public view "shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate" was
facially invalid contrary to First Amendment); Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569,
574-77 (1987) (declaring resolution of Board of Commissioners that banned all "First Amendment activities"
within airport overbroad in violation of First Amendment); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987)
(holding ordinance that outlaws interrupting a police officer while acting in the course of duty facially overbroad
in violation of the First Amendment).
239. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
240. Id. at 239-41.
241. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) & (D), which were the sections at issue).
242. Id. at 243.
243. Id.

244. Id.
245. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)) (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 256.
247. Id. at 250.
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First Amendment rights of the law abiding and, consequently, the statute was struck
down as "overbroad. ' 4 8
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,249 a successful overbreadth challenge
was directed at certain provisions of the federal Communications Decency Act
(CDA). 250 These provisions prohibited knowing transmission via the Internet of any
"communication which is obscene or indecent" to a person below
the age of
eighteen 5 ' as well as any "patently offensive" communications to such a person.5 2
The Court said that, "[g]iven the size of the potential audience for most [Internet]
messages, in the absence of a viable age verification process," a sender of such
communication would be assumed to have knowledge the communication might be
received by a minor contrary to the law, a specter that "would surely burden
communications among adults. 2 53 Recognizing that "[t]he breadth of the CDA's
leverage is wholly unprecedented," reaching "discussions about prison rape or safe
sexual practices, artistic images that include nude subjects, and arguably the card
catalogue of the Carnegie Library, 254 the Court concluded that the CDA suffered
from "facial overbreadth" when weighed against the First Amendment right of free
expression. 215
Of course, if the Court is convinced an enactment reflects "some" overbreadth 25 6
rather than "substantial" overbreadth,257 the enactment will not be invalidated on
First Amendment overbreadth grounds. 58 Such was the case in Ashcroft v. American
Civil Liberties Union,259 where the Court rejected an overbreadth attack on the
federal Child Online Protection Act (COPA). 260 The terms of the COPA prohibited
commercial display of sexually explicit materials that are "harmful to minors" on
the World Wide Web.2 6' The Court concluded COPA's reference to "contemporary
community standards" as a measuring stick to determine what is "harmful" did not
alone render COPA unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. 262 The
Court stated, because Congress narrowed the range of content outlawed by COPA
in a manner similar to the definition of obscenity it approved in Miller v.
California,263 "any variance caused by the statute's reliance on community standards

248. Id. at 252-54, 256.
249. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
250. Id. at 876-82.
251. Id. at 859 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)).
252. Id. at 860 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)).
253. Id. at 876.
254. Id. at 877-78.
255. Id. at 879-85.
256. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 584 (2002) (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 896 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
257. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
258. Id. at 584. See also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 (2003) (declaring petitioner-leafleter challenge
of housing authority's trespass policy on overbreadth grounds unsuccessful in failing to demonstrate policy
prohibited a "substantial" amount of speech as compared to its many legitimate applications).
259. 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
260. Id. at 585.
261. Id. at 569 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)).
262. Id. at 584-85.
263. Id. (referring to Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
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' 2
is not substantial enough to violate the First Amendment. , ' Here, the Court
some aspect of
on
continued its pattern of not accepting any limitation
265
communication as overbroad.

IV. RECOGNIZING OVERBREADTH OUTSIDE THE
FREE SPEECH CONTEXT
There are a limited number of cases in which the Court used overbreadth or an
analysis paralleling overbreadth to strike down statutes that were infringing upon
26 6
rights falling outside the scope of the First Amendment. While these cases are
scattered and few, these cases do exist and there has been enough language written
on the subject so that an argument could be made that the overbreadth doctrine
indeed exists outside the free speech context.
A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases priorto Schall and Salerno
1. Right to Travel: Aptheker v. Secretary of State
The U.S. Supreme Court has observed, "The right of interstate travel has
'267 The first case
repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom.
where it could be argued overbreadth was used outside the context of free speech
26 9
involved the right to travel. 268 In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, a group of U.S.
citizens who were ranking officials of the Communist Party of the United States had
their passports revoked under a section of the Subversive Activities Control Act of

264. Id. at 585 (emphasis added). The Court explicitly refused to express any view as to "whether COPA
suffers from substantial overbreadth for other reasons." Id.
265. See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Co., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (finding
regulation that limited access to information in hands of police department regarding arrestees' addresses not
overbroad); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (ruling prohibition against possession of child pornography not
vague).
266. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981),
Justice Marshall stated in his dissent, "Because of the risk that exercise of personal freedoms may be chilled by
broad regulation, we permit facial overbreadth challenges without a showing that the moving party's conduct falls
within the protected core." Id. at 427 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Among other cases he cites for support of this
statement (all of which are discussed or cited in this article), UnitedStates v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), is described
as a "facial challenge under the Fifteenth Amendment." Matheson, 450 U.S. at 428 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Reese dealt with an indictment against two inspectors of a municipal election in Kentucky for refusing to count the
vote of a black person contrary to a federal statute. Reese, 92 U.S. at 215. The defendant argued that, although the
Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress to punish discrimination based on race, the federal statute enacted by
Congress under which defendants were indicted did not "confine its provisions to the terms of the Fifteenth
Amendment" but rather exceeded the second section of the Amendment that authorized only "appropriate
legislation." Id. at 220-22. The Court insisted that the "general language" of the statute was "broad enough to cover
wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional jurisdiction." Id. at 221. In other words, the Court felt this
was not the type of "appropriate legislation" the Amendment could tolerate. As one constitutional scholar reported,
Reese "nullified" the Enforcement Act of 1870, a matter that was not rectified until the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1957. EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 535 (Harold W. Chase & Craig
R. Ducat eds., 14th ed. 1978). In any event, Reese may be the first example of the overbreadth doctrine at work.
Significantly, it is not a First Amendment decision.
267. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974).
268. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
269. Id.
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1950.270 This act made it a felony for a member of a Communist organization to
apply for, use, or attempt to use a passport.2 7'
These individuals filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in a U.S.
district court.27 2 The plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutional and in direct
violation of the right of liberty to travel abroad guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 273 Although the district court denied relief, upon
review, the Court held that the section at issue of the Subversive Activities Control
Act too broadly and indiscriminately restricted the right to travel and, thus, abridged
liberties guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 274 The Court, quoting Kent v.
Dulles,275 stated, "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without the due process of law under the Fifth Amendment., 276
The Court focused on the language of the act itself and stressed the fact that the act
"sweeps too widely... across the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment."27' 7
The
Court insisted, "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. 278
The Court recognized that the government had "less drastic" means within its power
to protect national security interests and that the abridgement of liberty in this case
was substantial.27 9 While the Court did not explicitly state that this law was
"overbroad," the Court strongly implied this through its language. 28'
The Court
stated that the act "is patently not a regulation 'narrowly drawn to prevent the
supposed evil.' ' 28' The Court considered the concerns that arose from what it had
described as an unnecessarilybroadstatute and stated that laws having the potential
of abridging liberty should be narrow in scope, for "precision must be the
touchstone of legislation so affecting basic freedoms. "282
Since the Aptheker case involved a personal liberty, the right to travel, the Court
examined the law consistent with its approach in cases involving the First
Amendment.283 Ultimately, the Court said the regulation was "unconstitutional on
its face. ' ,28 ' This was a break from previous case law because the Court in fact relied
on the overbreadth doctrine in a case that did not involve the right to free speech.285
According to Aptheker, if one's "personal liberties" were being violated, the

270. Id. at 502-03, 505.
271. Id. at 501-02 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 785 (6)).
272. Id. at 503.
273. Id. at 503-04.
274. Id. at 514.
275. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
276. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958)).
277. Id. at 514.
278. Id. at 508 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1958)).
279. Id. at 512-14 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
280. Id. at 514 ("The broad and enveloping prohibition indiscriminately excludes plainly relevant
considerations such as the individual's knowledge, activity, commitment, and purposes in and places for travel.").
281. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940)).
282. Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
283. Id. at 517.
284. Id. at 514.

285. Id.
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claimant could attack the statute as unnecessarily broad.286 For the first time, the
Court's litmus test for whether the law could be attacked under the rubric of
overbreadth was whether it involved "personal liberties."2'87 Obviously, this was a
much more expansive reading of the doctrine than had previously been given.288 The
Aptheker Court explicitly decided to follow the overbreadth approach taken in
NAACP v. Button 289 and Thornhill v. Alabama,29 two free speech cases. 291 The Court
thus analyzed Aptheker as it did in Button, taking into account "possible applications
of the statute, in other factual contexts besides that at bar. ' 292 The Court concluded
that, since the freedom of travel was a liberty closely related to free speech, those
challenging the act should have the act "judged on its face" and "not be required to
assume the burden of demonstrating that Congress could not have written a statute
'
constitutionally prohibiting their travel."293
It should be noted that the issue of third-party standing did not arise in this case
because the appellants were members of different Communist organizations who
had their passports revoked under this law, so the petitioners did have standing.294
Thus, the question of whether someone not directly affected by the law, but who felt
their right to travel "chilled," could bring a suit was never considered. However,
given the Court's citation to and application of free speech cases in their analysis of
Aptheker, this Court had demonstrated its willingness to apply an unmodified
overbreadth doctrine lifted intact from the free speech context. 295 Therefore, had the
facts been different, third party standing may have been granted in Aptheker.296
2. Right to Vote: Louisianav. United States
Although the overbreadth doctrine remained firmly entrenched in free speech
cases, one exception was Louisiana v. United States.297 In this case, the U.S.
government sued the State of Louisiana and four of its voting officials for
discrimination against black applicants for voting registration.298 The federal
government asserted that a long-standing plan by the state had been developed to

286. Id. at 508 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
287. Id.
288. All the decisions, excepting Reese, 92 U.S. 265, that employed the overbreadth doctrine up to this point
were First Amendment cases, although it is not until Ferber,458 U.S. 747, that the Court in 1982 described the
doctrine as being limited to First Amendment cases.
289. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
290. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
291. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 516 (citing Button, 371 U.S. 415; Thornhill, 310 U.S. 88).
292. Id. (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 432).
293. Id. at 517.
294. Id. at 517-18 (Black, J., concurring).
295. Id. at 517.
296. As stated, the Court did not expressly rely on the overbreadth doctrine in striking down the act. However,
the overbreadth doctrine was still in its developmental stages and the Court may have been a little wary of
expanding such a doctrine too quickly, especially outside the free speech context. The Court was entering uncharted
waters and perhaps was determined to proceed cautiously. The Warren Court itself was the standard bearer of the
overbreadth doctrine within the context of free speech. It might have felt that extending .the doctrine even further
would be like trying to leap a chasm in two jumps. Notwithstanding, this hesitation may have stymied the growth
of the overbreadth doctrine growing outside the free speech arena. If the Court would have actively used the test
to which it alluded in Aptheker, the overbreadth doctrine might have become a more encompassing doctrine.
297. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
298. Id. at 147.
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deprive minorities in Louisiana of the right to vote.299 Specifically, the state used an
"interpretation test," which required an applicant for registration to provide a
"reasonable interpretation" of any clause in the federal or Louisiana Constitution.3"'
Administration of this test systematically kept blacks from voting while
simultaneously permitting whites to vote.30 ' The lower federal court held, and the
Supreme Court affirmed, that the Louisiana Constitution and statutes requiring the
"interpretation test" were invalid on their face and, as applied, in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.302 The Court did not break much new ground
in this case, spending most of the opinion referring to the findings of the federal
district court 30 3 and noting that the lower court had invalidated the statute "[b]ecause
of the virtually unlimited discretion vested by the Louisiana laws in the registrars
of voters.... ,,304
The Supreme Court did, however, imply that the statute was overbroad.3 °5 The
Court noted that the state's test offered no definite standards for officials to
administer the test and no avenue of appeal to rejected applicants.3 6 The Court
declared, "This is not a test but a trap, sufficient to stop even the most brilliant man
on his way to the voting booth. The cherished right of people in a country like ours
to vote cannot be obliterated by the use of laws like this....
I t307
went on to note that
"[m]any of our cases have pointed out the invalidity of laws so completely devoid
of standards and restraints. 30 8 Obviously, voting registration officials must have
some power so as to enforce the proper voting laws. 30 9 However, giving the
registrars an uncontrolled discretion as to who can and cannot vote was deemed
something completely different. 3'0 As one commentator observed, the Louisiana law
was an extreme example of being overly broad. 31' Again, the Court did not refer
explicitly to overbreadth or the doctrine itself, but if one examines the Court's
analysis closely, it appears the Court is greatly concerned with the broad scope of
the Louisiana laws that authorized the "interpretation test., 31 2
3. Right to Privacy Against Government Surveillance: Berger v. New York
Berger v. New York,3t 3 decided two years after Louisiana v. United States,
reflected the Court's willingness to extend the overbreadth doctrine outside the

299. Id. at 147-48.

300. Id. at 148.
301.

Id. at 148-49.

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 150-53.
Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151-53.
Id. at 153.
Id.

308.

Id.

309. See id. at 150-54 (ruling problem is with "discriminatory" exercise of "uncontrolled discretion," not
discretion itself).
310. See id. at 150-51.
311. See also M. Katherine Boychuk, Comment, Are Stalking Laws UnconstitutionallyVague or Overbroad?,
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 769, 773 n.22 (1994) (noting Court "cases expanding overbreadth doctrine beyond free speech
and association").
312. See Louisiana,380 U.S. at 153.
313. 388 U.S.41 (1967).
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context of the First Amendment into the realm of the Fourth Amendment. 1 4 In
Berger, during a state bribery investigation, a recording device was planted in an
office by an ex parte order of a justice of the New York Supreme Court. 3 5 The
eavesdropping order permitted monitoring for sixty days.3" 6 The order was made
pursuant to a New York statute authorizing orders if "reasonable grounds" existed
for granting an application for such a recording.31 7 Portions of the recordings were
later admitted in evidence and played to the jury in the state's bribery prosecution,
in which the trial court upheld the validity of the statute and the accused was
convicted. 1 8
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction, concluding that "the language
of New York's statute is too broad in its sweep resulting in a trespassory intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area and is, therefore, violative of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 3,1 9 The Court noted that while the statute satisfied some
constitutional requirements, "the broad sweep of the statute is immediately
observable., 320 Here, the Court questioned whether "reasonable grounds" was the
equivalent of "probable cause," which the Fourth Amendment demands, concluded
the statute violated the Amendment's "particularity" requirement, said the sixty-dayauthorization was too long, found it contained no termination provision that would
be triggered when ample evidence was uncovered, and determined the statute had
no procedure for notice as required for conventional warrants.32'
Unlike Aptheker and Louisiana, the Court in Berger relied unabashedly on the
overbreadth doctrine outside the First Amendment context. 322 The Court explicitly
stated its distaste for such a broadly worded statute.3 23 Unfortunately, however, the
Court did not go into a very detailed analysis of the overbreadth doctrine, instead
canvassing the history of eavesdropping and exploring the issues of probable cause
and particularity. 324 Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the overbreadth doctrine was
used by the Berger Court outside the context of the First Amendment.32 5 While the
Court did not belabor the fact that it was using the overbreadth doctrine, the doctrine
seemed to flow naturally from the Court's analysis.3 26 The Court's approach was
succinct and focused: the language of the New York statute was unnecessarily
sweeping and therefore the law was overbroad.327 The Court appeared unconcerned
about which amendment had been violated by this overly broad law.328 The fact of
the matter was that a right granted in the Bill of Rights was being blatantly violated

54-60 (holding New York eavesdropping law violative of Fourth Amendment).
45.

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

321.

Id. at 54-60.

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

54 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 813-a (McKinney 1958)).
44-45.
44 (emphasis added).
54.

id. at
id. at
id.
id. at
id. at
id.
id. at

44.
54-60.
45-53.
44.
63--64.
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and this needed to be addressed.329 The overbreadth doctrine was applied because
it was the most logical remedy.
4. Right to Privacy and Contraceptives: Griswold v. Connecticut
In the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut,330 the Court struck down the
State of Connecticut's prohibition33' against the use of contraceptives by married
couples as an unconstitutional restriction of the right to privacy. 332 The executive
director of the state's Planned Parenthood League and a physician-professor at Yale
Medical School had been prosecuted as accomplices for advising a married couple
to use contraceptives.333 The Court said such right to use contraceptives was found
in "the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,"
pointing out that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights"-referring to the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments-"have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance., 334 The
Court concluded, "Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often
applied by this Court" that a governmental objective cannot be accomplished "by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly.. .invad[ing] the area of protected
freedoms., 335 Once again, an overbreadth-type of analysis was the lynchpin in a
Court decision not involving speech.336
In Eisenstadtv. Baird,337 the Court reviewed a Massachusetts stricture outlawing
distribution of contraceptives to single persons.338 In this case, the defendant had
been arrested for giving a single woman a package of vaginal foam following his
339
lecture on contraception given to a group of students at Boston University.
Eventually, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit struck down the measure as
unconstitutional, relying heavily on Griswold.'
When this matter reached the Court, it indicated that if the statute had the capacity
to reach the activity of married persons, it would be struck down as "overbroad" and
contrary to the right to marital privacy. 34' Rather than deciding the "important
question" of whether the First Circuit was correct when it ruled the Massachusetts
law "conflicts with fundamental human rights" of unmarried persons,342 it instead

329. See id. at 58.
330. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
331. Id. at 480 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (repealed 1969)).
332. id. at 485.
333. Id. at 480.
334. Id. at 484-86.
335. Id. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
336. Id. Of course, the Court in this decision was explicitly relying on substantive due process analysis; yet,
that analysis was glaringly similar, if not identical, to overbreadth analysis, which the Court would later insist in
Ferber, Schall, and Salerno is confined to the First Amendment. It is significant that the overbreadth approach to
challenging legislation that conflicts with a fundamental right would free the petitioner from the constraints of strict
scrutiny.
337. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
338. Id. at 441 n.2 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 272, § 21 (West 1966)).
339. Id. at 440.
340. Id. at 450-53 (citing Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401-02 (1st Cir. 1970) (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965))).
341. Id.at450-51.
342. Id. at 450-53 (quoting Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401-02 (1st Cir. 1970)).
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said, "whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the
'
The Court
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike."343
continued, "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 3" However, the Court said that ifGriswold's holding protecting the use of
contraceptives by married persons did not extend to the distributionof contraceptives to unmarried persons, then the measure raised Fourteenth Amendment equal
M 5 In other words, because any restriction on distribution of
protection problems."
contraceptives would run afoul of marital privacy if it extended to distribution to
married persons, "the State could not, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause,
outlaw distribution to unmarried but not to married persons. 346 Inasmuch as such
differential treatment would be "invidious" regulation, the Court decided the law
was unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds. 347 Finally, the Court had little
trouble concluding that the defendant-distributor had standing to advocate the rights
of persons desirous of obtaining and using contraceptives. 4
While Eisenstadt did not ultimately strike down the Massachusetts law on
TM 9
overbreadth grounds, it relied heavily on the overbreadth concept in its analysis.
The unconstitutional differential treatment arose precisely because the anticontraceptive regulation could not be extended to cover married individuals'
activities, lest it infringe marital privacy.35 Thus, the overbreadth problem that
would arise if Massachusetts attempted to restrict distribution to both married and
singles alike placed the law in an impossible position. If it was not discriminatory,
it was overbroad. If it was not overbroad, it was discriminatory.
5. Right to Privacy and Abortion: Roe v. Wade and Its Progeny
With the exception of the cases discussed in the preceding four sections, the
overbreadth doctrine stayed within the confines of free speech throughout the
1960s.3s' However, things changed when the issue of abortion became more
prevalent and the Court struck down various abortion prohibitions or restrictions
with an analysis identical to overbreadth.352 In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
abortion began to be addressed by the courts. In 1973, the Court handed down Roe
v. Wade,353 the landmark decision that legalized abortion across the country.354 In
Roe, the Court struck down a Texas statute prohibiting abortions on substantive due

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id. at 453.
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 443-46.
Id. at 450-51.
Id. at 454.
See, e.g., Robel, supra notes 116-126 and accompanying text.

352. Dorf, supra note 11, at 272 (noting that the Court's reference in Roe v. Wade that the statute was
unconstitutional because of its broad sweep represented "an analysis indistinguishable from First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine").
353. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
354. Id. (holding Texas statute outlawing all forms of abortion violative of substantive due process).
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process grounds, pointing out, among other concerns, that the Texas restriction on
medically advised abortions carried out to save the life of the mother "sweeps too
broadly. '35 Looking at the statute as a whole, it noted that the lower court in the
case had held that the statute was "overbroad" in light of a woman's constitutional
rights.356 Specifically, the federal district court had granted declaratory relief because
the abortion statutes were deemed overbroad, infringing a woman's Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.357 The Court in Roe then examined how other lower
courts had analyzed statutes in other states regulating abortion and pointed out that
many courts held state laws unconstitutional "because of vagueness or.. .overbreadth
and its abridgement of rights., 358 For example, in the companion case to Roe that
invalidated Georgia's abortion law, Doe v. Bolton,359 the federal district court ruling
(which Roe cited) had earlier stated that the Georgia abortion statute at issue was
invalid as a "matter of statutory overbreadth."36 In another case cited in Roe,3 6'
Babbitz v. McCann,36' a federal district court in Wisconsin found the abortion
restriction in question "suffer[ing] from an infirmity of fatal overbreadth. 363 While
the Court in Roe did not specifically rely on the "overbreadth doctrine" to strike
down the entire Texas statute, it had explicitly noted that the question of violating
substantive due process rights had been presented in the form of an overbreadth
argument. 3" In effect, the Court sided with those lower courts that had stated no
compelling state "interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a
physician and his pregnant patient might decide to have an abortion in the early
'
stages of pregnancy." 365
Thus, the Court, in this landmark case, brought an
overbreadth-type analysis in through the back door.
In 1992, Justice Scalia conceded, in a dissenting opinion in Ada v. Guam Society
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,366 that Roe "seemingly employed an
'overbreadth' approach-though without mentioning the term and without
analysis. 367 Various other commentators have agreed.368 The Roe Court's

355. Id. at 164.
356. Id. at 122 (citing Roe v. Wade, 14 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970)).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 154 (citing Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 804 (D. Conn. 1972) (holding Connecticut's
"overreaching" exercise of police power violative of due process); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1389 (N.D. I11.
1971) (ruling Illinois prohibition "too sweeping" to comport with due process); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986,
994 (D. Kan. 1972) (holding Kansas abortion provision "overbroad" contrary to due process); YWCA v. Kugler,
342 F. Supp. 1048, 1076 (D.N.J. 1972) (ruling New Jersey abortion restrictions violative of right to privacy); People
v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 204 (Cal. 1969) (declaring California abortion law is "invalid infringement" on woman's
rights and vague); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1972) (holding abortion prohibition vague)).
359. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
360. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affd sub. nom,
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
361. Id. at 154-55 (citing Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wisc. 1970).
362. 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.).
363. Id. at 302.
364. 410 U.S. at 122 (citing Roe, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970)).
365. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
366. 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's decision to deny certiorari).
367. Id. at 1012.
368. See, e.g., Dorf, supranote 11, at 272 ("[T]he Roe Court employed an analysis indistinguishable from
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine."); Fallon, supra note 11, at 859 n.29 (noting Court's use of overbreadth in
abortion cases as example of Court's application of doctrine outside First Amendment); Marc E. Isserles,

Winter 2004]

OVERBREADTH

willingness to permit the overbreadth doctrine (or an identical twin of the doctrine)
as a challenge to an infringement on a woman's right to choose would enable many
petitioners in future cases to do the same.369
After Roe, there also seemed to be a trend in some of the abortion cases that a
challenge to a statute restricting abortion often resulted in the enactment being first
struck down by the lower courts based on overbreadth, followed by the Supreme
Court's upholding the invalidation without explicitly referring to the overbreadth
doctrine. 37° This occurred in Roe and also was the case in Planned Parenthoodv.
Danforth.37' In Danforth,a challenge was made to the constitutionality of a Missouri
statute that set various limitations on abortions.372 There were seven specific
provisions attacked.373 The provision found by the lower court to be
"unconstitutionally overbroad" was the provision that required a physician to
"preserve" the fetus's life and health on pain of criminal penalty.374 Specifically, the
provision stated,
No person who performs or induces an abortion shall fail to exercise that degree
of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the
fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the
life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted.375
The lower court held this particular restriction to be unnecessarily "overbroad"
because it failed to exclude the pregnancy stage prior to viability. 376 The Supreme
Court affirmed this aspect of the lower court's ruling.377 It found this provision was
unconstitutional because it "impermissibly requires the physician to preserve the life
and health of the fetus, whatever the stage of pregnancy., 378 In addition, another
section of the statute outlawed the commonly used "saline technique" following the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy.379 The Court ruled that this provision was "an
unreasonable and arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit.. .the vast majority of
abortions after the first 12 weeks. 380 Thus, the Court again ratified the applicability

Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 410 n.224
(1998) ("[Tlhe abortion cases present perhaps the strongest case that the Court has applied something resembling
the First Amendment doctrine outside of the First Amendment.").
369. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
370. See Kevin Martin, Note, Stranger in a Strange Land: The Use of Overbreadth in Abortion
Jurisprudence,99 COLUM. L. REV. 173, 200 (1999) (acknowledging "overbreadth doctrine has also been extended
to include the substantive area of abortion law," although arguing against the extension); John Christopher Ford,
Note, The Casey Standardfor Evaluating FacialAttacks on Abortion Statues, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1443, 1450 (1997)
(stating that "the Court has used the overbreadth doctrine in abortion cases before and after.. .Salerno").
371. 428 U.S. 52, 75-77 (1976).
372. Id. at 57-59.
373. Id. at 58-59.
374. Id. at 59 (citing Danforth, 392 F. Supp. at 1371).
375. Id. at 59, 85-86 (app.) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.035 (1974)).
376. Id. at 59 (citing Danforth, 392 F. Supp. at 1371).
377. 428 U.S. at 82-84.
378. Id. at 83.
379. Id. at 76, 86-87 (app.) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.050 (repealed 1979)) ("[Tlhe method or technique
of abortion known as saline amniocentesis... is hereby prohibited after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.").
380. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
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" ' But again,
of the overbreadth doctrine in a case outside the context of free speech.38
the Court itself did not explicitly state that the statute was overbroad or indicate it
was relying on the doctrine of overbreadth.
Like Roe and Danforth, in Colautti v. Franklin382 the Court also examined a
successful challenge based on overbreadth grounds but invalidated the statute on
other grounds.383 In Colautti,a suit was brought challenging the constitutionality of
a section of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 384 which required a physician
to exercise the same standard of care on a "viable" fetus as would be required if it
was intended that the fetus be born alive.38 5 A three-judge federal district court
found the provision in question "unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and
enjoined its enforcement. 38 6 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the
portion of the statute was void for vagueness and thus found it "unnecessary to
consider appellees' alternative arguments based on the alleged overbreadth of [the

statute] ."'

In 1983, in City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc.,388 the
Court used an analysis similar to First Amendment overbreadth as it facially
invalidated an abortion restriction.389 In this case, the Court ruled an Ohio mandate
that abortions occurring after the first trimester be performed in a hospital 390 had,
quoting Danforth, "'the effect of inhibiting... the vast majority of abortions after the
first 12 weeks.' ' 39 1 In addition, it affirmed the lower court's facial invalidation of
provisions "deal[ing] with parental consent, informed consent, a 24-hour waiting
period, and the disposal of fetal remains. 392 Like the Danforth ruling, the Akron
Center decision was based on the notion that a particular limitation on access to an
abortion was unduly inhibiting the woman's right to choose, something the Court
found violative of the affected persons' right to privacy.
C. Post-Schall and Salerno U.S. Supreme CourtDecisions
After the Court's initial hint in Ferber and pronouncement in Schall that the
concept of overbreadth had no life beyond First Amendment free speech cases, there
continued to appear Court decisions that either (1) employed what might be
described as an overbreadth-type analysis or, instead,39 3 (2) affirmed lower court

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
physician
technique

See id.
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
Id. at 380-81, 390.
Id. at 380-81.
Id. at 380-81 n.1 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605 (A) (repealed 1982)). The statute subjected a
who performs an abortion to "potential criminal liability if he fails to utilize a statutorily prescribed
when the fetus 'is viable' or when there is 'sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable."' Id.

at 381.

386. Id.
387. Id. at 390.
388. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
389. Id. at 438-39.
390. Id. at431-38.
391. Id. at 438 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976)).
392. Id. at 452. But see H.L v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-13 (1981) (rejecting facial attack on parental
notification law of Utah brought by fifteen-year-old unemancipated girl who lived with and was dependent on her
parents and who had made no showing as to her maturity).
393. See infra notes 395-413 and accompanying text.

Winter 2004)

OVERBREADTH

rulings that themselves relied on the overbreadth doctrine.394 No better illustration
of the first category of decisions exists than Hodel v. Irving,395 decided rather
curiously after Schall but only one week before Salerno.
1. Right to Property Interests: Hodel v. Irving
In Hodel v. Irving,3 96 three American Indians filed a claim asserting that a section
of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 391 was in violation of their Fifth
Amendment property rights.398 This statute was implemented as a means of
ameliorating the problem of extreme fractionation of Indian lands.399 In the
nineteenth century, land was allotted to individual American Indians and held in
trust by the United States in order to protect the allottees from disposing of their
lands to white settlers. 4° However, the policy resulted in splintering of acreages into
smaller and smaller parcels, sometimes with dozens of owners.4 ° ' Congress
responded by enacting the Indian Land Consolidation Act, which provided that "no
undivided fractional interest" in such lands "shall [descend] by intestacy or devise
but shall escheat to [the] tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the
total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the
preceding year before it is due to escheat." 2
Petitioners, several American Indians, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Dakota, claiming that this statute resulted in a taking of property
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 40 3 "The District
Court concluded that the statute was constitutional" and that petitioners had "no
vested interest in the property of the decedents prior to their deaths." The Court
of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's finding and stated,
"Although it agreed that appellees had no vested rights in the decedents' property,
it concluded that their decedents had a right, derived from the original Sioux
allotment statute, to control disposition of their property at death." 5 Further, the
federal appellate court "held that appellees had standing to invoke that right and that
the taking of that right without compensation to decedents' estates violated the Fifth
Amendment." 406
The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's determination. The Court
concluded that "the regulation here amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right
to pass on a certain type of property-the small undivided interest-to one's

394. See infra notes 414-434 and accompanying text.
395. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).

396. Id.
397.

Id. at 709 (quoting Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L 97-459, Title IL § 207 (codified as

amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (2000))).
398.

Id. at 710.

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id. at 707-09,711-12.
Id. at 706-07.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708-09 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 207)).
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id. (citing Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d. 1260 (8th Cir. 1985)).

406. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 34

heirs. 40' 7 This "complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a particular
class of property" constituted a "taking" contrary to the Fifth Amendment. 0 8
Notwithstanding Congress's laudible goal of addressing the "serious public
problem" of "extreme
fractionation of Indian land," this measure, said the Court,
"goes too far.' 4 19 Very significantly, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, stated,
The Court's grant of relief to [petitioners] based on the rights of the hypothetical
decedents.. necessarily rests on the implicitadoption ofthe overbreadthanalysis
that has heretofore been restricted to the First Amendment area. The Court uses
the language of takings jurisprudence to express its conclusion that [the
regulation] violates the Fifth Amendment, but the stated reason is that [it] "goes
too far"...because it might interfere with testamentary dispositions, or
inheritances, that result in the consolidation of property interests rather than their
increased fractionation. That reasoning may apply to some decedents, but it does
not apply to these litigated decedents.41
In addition, Justice Stevens felt that the overbreadth doctrine was not applicable
because, "[e]ven if overbreadth analysis were appropriate in a case outside of the
First Amendment area, the Court's use of it on these facts departs from
precedent., 411 Stevens noted that "[t]he Court generally does not grant relief unless
there has been a showing that the invalid applications of the statute represent a
substantial portion of its entire coverage. 4 2 Thus, Justice Stevens preferred that the
majority not rest what he perceived to be a correct outcome on its "novel
overbreadth approach. 413
In any event, Justice Stevens correctly recognized, proverbially, that if it "looks
like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck." The entire
analysis relied on by the majority, including its usage of unconventional standing
allowing those not directly aggrieved to assert the interests of hypothetical parties
who would be aggrieved, was undoubtedly identical to that of overbreadth.1 4 Here
again, the Court's actions spoke louder than its words.
2. Right to Privacy and Abortion: Roe's Progeny
After Schall and Salerno, the Court continued its pattern of entertaining
overbreadth claims against abortion restrictions without outright rejection of the
claim due to the fact that the restriction did not involve speech. In Webster v.
4 16
Reproductive Health Services, 4 5 the constitutionality of a Missouri statute
containing several restrictions, including restrictions on public funding of abortion,
was challenged as violating the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.4 7
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Id. at 716.

Id. at 717-18.
Id. at 718 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 724 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 725 n.10.
Id.
Id. at 726.
See id. at 724-26.
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Id. at 499.
Id. at501-02.
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This attack was a facial challenge on the statute seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.4 18 Several provisions, including the public funding bar, were struck down in
vague and "inconsistent
the federal district and federal appellate courts for being
9
' ' 41
While the Court upheld
Wade.
v.
with the right to an abortion enunciated in Roe
regulation of
legitimate
a
reflected
the statute on the grounds that each measure
presented.4 2 °
challenge
overbreadth
abortion, it did not question the framing of the
However, it should be noted that Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, stated
"that appellees' facial challenge to the constitutionality of Missouri's ban.. .cannot
succeed. 42' She based her reasoning in part on the fact that "we have not recognized
an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,"
quoting Salerno.422
The vast majority of the abortion cases that have come to the Supreme Court after
Roe v. Wade have involved facial attacks on state statutes. Examples include
Hodgson v. Minnesota423 and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetriciansand
Gynecologists.424 Quite important was Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,425 wherein the Court reaffirmed the principles of Roe v.
Wade and its recognition of a woman's right to choose an abortion prior to fetal
state
viability426 but introduced an analysis that inquires whether a particular
427
case,
this
In
choose.
to
right
woman's
restriction places an "undue burden" on the
428
the Court ruled a spousal notification provision would "operate as a substantial
obstacle" to the right to choose "in a large fraction of.. .cases" and, thus, was facially
invalid.429 Also significant was the Court's denial of certiorari in Ada v. Guam
4 30
for
Society of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists, following the Court of Appeals
43' wherein
prohibition,
abortion
Guam's
of
the Ninth Circuit's facial invalidation
Justice Scalia, in dissent of the denial of certiorari, conceded Roe had employed an
"overbreadth approach" and complained the Ninth Circuit was continuing to use
"overbreadth impermissibly," a doctrine he believed should be restricted to First

418. Id. at 501.
419. Id. at 502-04.
420. Id. at 521 (noting Roe's holding "that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed the right to an
abortion derived from the Due Process Clause.. .and we leave it undisturbed").
421. Id. at 523 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
422. Id. at 524 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
423. 497 U.S. 417, 450-55 (1990) (declaring requirement that both parents be notified of minor's abortion
decision was unconstitutional).
424. 476 U.S. 747, 758-72 (1986) (holding various provisions of Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act facially
invalid).
425. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
426. Id. at 845-46.

427. Id. at 879-901 (finding medical emergency definition, informed consent requirements, twenty-four-hour
did
waiting period, parental consent provision, and reporting requirement of Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act
not impose undue burden while spousal notification provision amounted to an undue burden and, as such, was ruled
invalid).
428. Id. at 887-95 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (West 1989)).
429. Id. at 895. It is important to note that the Court did not employ Salerno's "no set of circumstances"
condition to a finding of facial invalidity outside the First Amendment. See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying
text for Salerno's pronouncement.
430. 506 U.S. 1011 (1992).
431. Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 962 F.2d 1366, 1374, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1011
1011
(1992) (holding an anti-abortion statute unconstitutional in light of Roe v. Wade), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
(1992).
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Amendment cases.432 In any event, each of these cases involved an overbroad statute
that was alleged to be infringing upon some aspect of a woman's right to choose,
which is generally considered not within the ambit of the First Amendment but
rather the Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment.4 33 In all of these cases, neither the
majority, nor even the dissent, with the exception of Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Webster and Justice Scalia's dissent in Ada, ever questioned or doubted the form
of the challenge presented.434 While this does not necessarily infer the overbreadth
doctrine could be used to invalidate the statute in the abortion context, its silence
concerning the doctrine speaks volumes. In a fashion, the abortion line of cases is
the most prevalent example of the Court's use of overbreadth-type analysis outside
the First Amendment arena.435
3. Right to Raise Children: Troxel v. Granville
More recently, there has been an intimation that the overbreadth doctrine may
apply to additional fundamental rights falling outside the scope of the First
Amendment.436 In Troxel v. Granville,437 the Court determined that application of
a Washington statute limiting parental rights was too "broad" and in violation of the
Due Process Clause.438 The Washington statute "permit[ted] '[a]ny person' to
petition a superior court for child visitation rights 'at any time,' and authorize[d] that
court to grant such visitation rights whenever 'visitation may serve the best interest
of the child.' ,, 439 Petitioners, grandparents of two children, "petitioned a Washington
Superior Court for the right to visit their grandchildren."4 Respondent, the mother
of the two children, opposed the petition. 4" The case eventually went before the
Washington Supreme Court, which determined that the statute as a whole
unconstitutionally interfered with the fundamental right of parents to rear their
children and that it "sweeps too broadly."" 2
The U.S. Supreme Court began its analysis by pointing out that parents' interest
in "the care, custody and control of their child-is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests...."" 3 The Court noted that the State of Washington
statute contained no presumption that a child's best interests be served by parental
decision making. 4 Also, the Court observed that the petitioners had not alleged and

432. 506 U.S. at 1012-13.
433. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
434. Fallon, supra note 11, at 859 n.29.
435. See Isserles, supra note 368, at 410 n.224 (acknowledging abortion cases are strongest evidence that
overbreadth has been used outside First Amendment). However, Isserles argues that in actuality much of the Court's
abortion jurisprudence does not support the "widely held view" that the overbreadth doctrine has been extended
beyond the First Amendment. Id. at 414. Yet, later he concedes that it is "hard to quarrel with the conclusion that
Casey employed some type of overbreadth doctrine." Id. at 458.
436. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
437. Id.
438. Id. at 67-68.
439. Id. at 60 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (West 1987)).
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 63.
443. Id. at 65.
444. Id. at 67.
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no court had found the parents unfit."5 The Court stated that the statute was
"breathtakingly broad" because the "language effectively permits any third party
seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the
'
parent's children to state-court review." The Court further noted that "[o]nce the
visitation petition has been filed in court and the matter is placed before a judge, a
parent's decision that visitation would not be in the child's best interest is accorded
no deference." 447
Notwithstanding the Court's concern about the "breathtakingly broad" reach of
the statute, Justice O'Connor stated, on behalf of the Court, that it was resting its
"decision on the sweeping breadth of [the statute] andthe applicationof that broad,
unlimited power" and, consequently, declined to rule the statute facially invalid as
8
had the Washington Supreme Court." The Court would not say the statute violated
9
"the Due Process clause as a per se matter." Justice Souter, in a concurring
opinion, was perplexed as to why the Court did not uphold the state supreme court's
facial invalidation, particularly where "specific application of the state statute by the
trial court [is an issue] not before us...." 4 In his mind, "the state statute sweeps too
451
broadly and is unconstitutional on its face.
Troxel is significant in several respects. First, the Court relies on an overbreadthtype analysis in an additional constitutional arena: that of parental rights. Next, the
452
Court resorts to an overbroad as appliedevaluation, thereby requiring traditional
standing, which is an unconventional approach to overbreadth, to say the least. But
finally, and most importantly, this decision dramatizes the complete absence of
principled decision making that is at the heart of the Court' s blind allegiance to the
proposition that overbreadth only lives within the walls of the First Amendment. On
scope of the
the one hand, Justice O'Connor is overwhelmed by the "breathtaking"
453 Yet, because of her
stricture when weighed against a fundamental right.
pronouncement in her concurrence in Webster and the Court's insistence that the
overbreadth doctrine has no vitality outside of First Amendment free speech cases,
she is forced to reject the facial challenge that even Washington's highest court
recognized and, instead, rely on unprecedented overbreadth as appliedreasoning to
4
5
strike down the trial court's order.

In any event, the decisions before and after Schall and Salerno lend themselves
to the following observations. Based on scattered U.S. Supreme Court case law,
there appears to be an unspoken recognition of the overbreadth doctrine outside the
First Amendment. 455 However, one must concede it is rarely used, rarely mentioned,
and rarely considered. Nonetheless, while various decisions in the past twenty-five

445. Id. at 68.
446. Id. at 67.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).

449. Id.
450. Id. at 75-76 (Souter, J., concurring).
451. Id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
452. Id. at66-67.

453. Id.
454. See id.
455. See, e.g., Aptheker, 378 U.S. 500; Roe, 410 U.S. 113, discussed suprasections VI.A.I and VI.A.5.
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years note that the Court has not recognized the overbreadth doctrine outside the
First Amendment context, 56 this is not-completely true.4 57 Indeed, the Court has not
been entirely forthright when it says it has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the free speech context, especially when one considers the cases discussed
above. The Court is not being entirely clear, either. In the cases where overbreadth,
or an analysis that parallels overbreadth, is used outside the First Amendment, the
Court has been less than explicit in whether it was in fact using the overbreadth
doctrine.458 For example, in most of the abortion cases cited, the word "overbreadth"
is rarely, if at all, used, but the underlying principles of the doctrine are at work.459
Meanwhile, Hodel illustrates the Court's actual use of the doctrine without, as
Justice Scalia points out, any acknowledgment. 4' Finally, Troxel reflects the
complete folly in attempting to limit overbreadth to only one constitutional right
when other fundamental rights may suffer a crying need for the same protection.46'
V. LOWER COURT CONFUSION
A. Lower Court Cases Priorto Schall and Salerno
Earlier lower court caselaw utilizing overbreadth analysis reflected little hesitancy
to consider the concept in statutory challenges not based on free speech.462 Some
semblance of the overbreadth doctrine surfaced in at least one lower court even
before the U.S. Supreme Court used it in Thornhill v. Alabama,46 3 discussed
earlier.4 4 In Liberty Highway Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission,46 5 the
federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan considered the claim of
a plaintiff, a trucking company, that certain Michigan regulations on common
carriers violated, amongst other concerns, the Interstate Commerce Clause of the
federal Constitution as well as the Michigan Constitution.466 Plaintiff insisted its
transportation of freight engaged it solely in interstate business and no intrastate
business, which, ostensibly, the state could regulate. 467 The Court ruled that any
provisions of the enactment that "are confined in their application to regulation of
common carriers in connection with the public highways [that] are not a direct
burden upon interstate commerce" are acceptable, but those that are "not so
confined" so as to "unduly burden" interstate commerce are in "contravention of the
federal Constitution, and void." 8 Here, one provision that required insurance and
indemnity bonds for the protection of persons and property was found to be a direct
456. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. 739.
457. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
458. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Roe, 410 U.S.
113.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.

See e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
See supra notes 395-413 and accompanying text.
See Troxel, 530 U.S. 27.
See supra notes 435-460 and accompanying text.
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
294 F. 703 (E.D. Mich. 1923) (per curiam).
Id. at 706.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
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burden on interstate commerce and void.469 Meanwhile, another provision was "so
broad" in its terms that it was deemed contrary to certain State of Michigan
constitutional requirements."'
" ' a Hawaii Supreme Court decision, defendants were
In State v. Shigematsu,47
charged with violation of a state statute that made it an offense to be "found present
in a room or place barred, or barricaded, or built, or protected in a manner to make
it difficult of [sic] access or ingress to police officers where gambling implements
'
The defendants attacked the enactment as
were exhibited or exposed to view."472
Due Process Clause of the federal and
to
the
vague and overly broad contrary
473
Court stated that "[a]ny home built
Supreme
Hawaii
Hawaii constitutions. The
reach of the statute. 74 Also, "it
the
within"
come
with locks in the doors would
would appear that any person within a room of his home where cards, dice or chips
' Having "no doubt that the statute
are in view would be violating this statute."475
476
[was] vague and overly broad," the court ruled the statute violative of due process.
Another earlier decision having nothing to do with free speech, but which
477
nevertheless relied on "overbreadth" analysis, was State v. Starks, a Wisconsin
Supreme Court opinion. A Wisconsin vagrancy statute defined a "vagrant" as "[a]
is
person found in or loitering near any structure, vehicle or private grounds who 478
presence.,
his
for
account
to
unable
is
and
owner
the
of
consent
the
there without
After determining that the Wisconsin vagrancy law's definition of "loiter" failed to
479
include or imply any sinister or criminal purpose on the part of the loiterer, the
court considered whether it suffered "the defect of overbreadth" contrary to
8
substantive due process, concluding that it did. Operating from the premise that
"[t]he [F]ourteenth [A]mendment... protects persons from incursions by the state
into certain areas of their life, and [that] an overbroad statute is constitutionally
defective if it extends state criminal authority beyond the proper reach of
government into one of these protected private areas," the court found the Wisconsin
statute's clear wording could cover "[s]ightseers, window-shoppers and persons

469. Id. (referring to 1923 MICH. PUB. ACTS 209, § 7).
470. Id. at 706, referring to 1923 MICH. PUB. ACTS 209, § 3, which provides that
[a]ny and all persons, firms or corporations, now engaged, or which shall hereafter engage, in
the transportation of persons or property for hire by motor vehicle, upon or over the public
highways of this state, or any of them, as above described, shall be common carriers, and, so far
as applicable all laws of this state now in force or hereafter enacted, regulating the transportation
of persons or property by other common carriers, including regulation of rates, shall apply with
equal force and effect to such common carriers of persons and property by motor.
While Sections 3 and 7 were deemed facially invalid, the provisions of both sections were separable from the
remainder of the Act. Id. at 708.
471. 483 P.2d 997 (Haw. 1971).
472. Id. at 998 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 746-6).
473. Id. at 998.
474. Id. at 999.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. 186 N.W. 2d 245 (Wis. 1971).
478. Id. at 247 (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.02(2)).
479. Id. at 247-49. On this basis, the court found it to be vague. Id.
480. Id. at 249-50.
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merely taking a walk"
and, as such, was so "overly broad that it [was] unconstitu48 1
tional on its face.",
The Hawaii Supreme Court, in In the Interest of Doe,4 2 relied in part on the
overbreadth doctrine to strike down a curfew ordinance that prohibited persons
under the age of eighteen from loitering in a public place between 10:00 P.M. and
the time of sunrise the following morning unless accompanied by a parent, legal
guardian, or spouse.483 Noting that it had ruled in 1930 that a "statute making it
illegal to 'habitually loaf, loiter and/or idle upon any.. .public place"' was
"unconstitutionally overbroad because it drew 'no distinction between conduct
that
is calculated to harm and that which is essentially innocent," 484 it found the
ordinance in question violative of substantive due process because "its broad sweep
has the effect of inhibiting otherwise lawful conduct. 4 5
486 an
In State v. Pilcher,
Iowa Supreme Court decision examined an "overbreadth" claim directed at a State of Iowa proscription against "sodomy. ' 487 In this
case, the defendant was alleged to have had a woman not his wife perform fellatio
upon him. 488 The defendant claimed the statute was, among other objections,
unconstitutionally void for "overbreadth. '489 Noting that "the emerging right of
privacy protects private sexual activity between consenting adults of the opposite
sex not married to each other," 490 the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that
substantive due process required that the court rule the statute to be "an invasion of
fundamental rights, such as the personal right of privacy, to the extent it attempts to
regulate through use of criminal penalty consensual sodomitical practices performed
in private by adult persons of the opposite sex. '
Of course, not all overbreadth claims have succeeded in the lower courts. For
example, in Thompson v. Lorenzo,492 the New York Supreme Court, Kings County,
examined a claim that a New York Secretary of State's order prohibiting solicitation
of real estate listings by licensed real estate brokers in certain geographical areas
designed to prevent panic selling was, among other things, overbroad contrary to
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process "because it completely
prohibits [the] legitimate business endeavors" of affected brokers.493 The New York
Supreme Court disagreed, concluding "that the order is not overbroad" because it
was properly motivated by the interest of prohibiting a "pernicious practice"
inimical to property interest stability in the affected areas. 494 Significantly, the

481.

Id.

482. 513 P.2d 1385 (Haw. 1973).
483. Id. at 1386 (citing HONOLULU REV. ORD. § 13-3A. 1).
484. Id. at 1387 (citing Territory v. Anduha, 31 Haw. 459 (1930).
485. Id. at 1388. The court also determined that the Honolulu ordinance was vague. Id.
486. 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).
487. Id. at 352 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 705.1 (repealed 1976)) ("Whoever shall have carnal copulation in
any opening of the body except sexual parts, with another human being, ** *, shall be deemed guilty of sodomy.").
488. Id. at 350-51.
489. Id. at 354.
490. Id. at 356.
491. Id. at 359 (holding statute invalid as applied).
492. 356 N.Y.S. 2d 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
493. Id. at 765.
494. Id. at 766.
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court's rejection of the overbreadth claim had nothing to do with the fact that it was
not predicated on First Amendment concerns.195
496
Similarly, in Burkhart Randall Division of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, a U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case, an employee sought declaratory and
injunctive relief prohibiting an attempted inspection of its facility by an inspector
of the Occupational Safety _nd Health Administration (OSHA).4 97 In its claim, the
plaintiff-employer claimed an administrative warrant issued by a federal district
court authorizing OSHA's inspection of plaintiffs workplace was "overbroad in
scope. '498 After a lengthy examination of Fourth Amendment caselaw addressing
the "relaxed or flexible standard of administrative probable cause" found in
administrative inspection situations,499 the Seventh Circuit concluded, "There may
be cases in which extraordinary circumstances would render such an inspection
unreasonably broad, but this is not such a case." 5" Again, a lower court of review
entertained an overbreadth claim outside of First Amendment territory here, one
based on the Fourth Amendment. While the court rejected the claim, it did so on
grounds other than simply because First Amendment concerns were not
implicated.5 '
Naturally, some overbreadth claims prior to Schall and Salerno were based on
First Amendment protections. 0 2 For example, in Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 3
the California Supreme Court held that a provision of the California Constitution
requiring an oath of public employees that they avoid membership of any
organization advocating overthrow of the government violated the "cherished
freedom of association protected by the First Amendment." 5" The court stated that
when the "government seeks to limit those freedoms on the basis of legitimate and
substantial governmental purposes, such as eliminating subversives from the public
service, those purposes cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.""5 5 Likewise, in
State v. Regan, °6 an opinion from the Washington Supreme Court, a construction
of a state obscenity statute,50 7 was found to suffer from substantial "overbreadth. 5 °8
As the foregoing cases illustrate, prior to Schall and Salerno, the overbreadth
doctrine was not relegated to First Amendment free speech." 9 Indeed, there

495. Id. at 765.
496. 625 F. 2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1980).
497. Id. at 1315.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 1316-25.
500. Id. at 1326.
501. Id.
502. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488,497 (9th Cir. 1964) (finding provision of federal LaborManagement Reporting Act making it illegal for member of Communist party to hold office in a labor union
violative of First Amendment's right of association and void), aftd, 381 U.S. 437 (1964).
503. 434 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1967).
504. Id. at 963.
505.

Id.

506.
507.
508.
509.

640 P.2d 725 (Wash. 1982).
Id. at 726-27 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.010 (repealed 1984)).
id. at 728.
See supra notes 461-509 and accompanying text.
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appeared caselaw where a stricture was even tossed out for being "unconstitutionally
overbroad" in the face of a particular state constitutional protection.5 1 °
B. Lower Court Cases after Schall and Salerno
The implications of the Court's pronouncements in Schall and Salerno, diluted
to some extent by its peculiar analysis in cases like Hodel, Troxel, and even Casey,
where it appears to flirt with overbreadth thinking beyond free speech, have left
lower courts to decipher the Court's somewhat inconsistent line of decisions. For
example, two different cases involving similar factual situations show how different
" '
courts treat the overbreadth issue. In Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco,51
a class of homeless individuals challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance
and state law that prohibited, among other activities, camping or sleeping in public
parks or possession of shopping carts.5 12 Among the challenges to the statutes was
the claim that the provisions were overbroad in violation of one's due process
rights.1 3 The federal district court in California rejected the overbreadth claim,
stating, "Overbreadth is a challenge which may be successfully leveled only where
First Amendment concerns are at stake."5 4 Because no one suggested the First
Amendment was applicable, the claim failed."'
However, in Pottinger v. City of Miami,'16 a group of homeless individuals
challenged the City of Miami because the city had arrested thousands of homeless
people for conduct such as eating and sleeping in public places under the authority
of various City of Miami ordinances and State of Florida statutes.517 Among the
challenges to the various statutes was the claim that the laws were unconstitutionally
overbroad.518 The District Court for the Southern District Court of Florida stated,
"Courts.. .have overturned vagrancy and loitering statutes on due process grounds
after finding them overbroad" and then held that the ordinances in question were
520
unconstitutionally overbroad." 9 The court, citing to Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
noted that a statute is overbroad if "the enactment reaches a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct. '52' The court further noted that because the
ordinance "implicate[s] constitutionally protected rights under the eighth
amendment [prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment] and... the equal
522
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment," the statute was overbroad.

510. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 501 P.2d 744, 744-45 (Colo. 1972) (municipal ordinance that
could be construed as prohibiting having a dangerous weapon in a place of business is contrary to COLO. CONST.
art. 1H,§ 13).
511. 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
512. Id. at 845-47.
513. Id. at 862.
514. Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984)).
515. Id.
516. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
517. Id. at 1553-54.
518. ld. at 1576.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 1577 (citing Hershey, 834 F.2d 937,940 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1987)) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982))).
521. Id. (quoting Hershey, 834 F.2d at 940 n.5).
522. Id. (as applied).
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In comparing these two cases, one sees a glaring inconsistency. Here, two federal
courts faced essentially the same question but approached it from different angles,
using completely different case law to support their respective conclusions. It is
quite interesting that, even though both courts reached completely opposite
outcomes, U.S. Supreme Court precedent supports each court's analysis.523 The
more important question to consider is how the Pottinger court reached its
conclusion that the ordinances and statutes were overbroad.524 It appears that the
court took a very broad approach to the overbreadth doctrine and cited to Flipside
as its guidance.52 5 The court's reliance on "constitutionally protected rights" allowed
it to apply the overbreadth doctrine to all rights enshrined in the Constitution, not
just those in the First Amendment.5 26 The Pottinger court ignored Schall v.
Martin,527 which is the case the Joyce court used to throw out the overbreadth
challenge.528 This is a perfect example of what can occur when the Supreme Court's
stance regarding the scope of a doctrine reflects mixed messages. The Court's
inconsistent application of the overbreadth doctrine has led lower courts to apply the
doctrine in an arbitrary manner, resulting in real constitutional violations to real
people.
Pottingeris not alone in recognizing overbreadth beyond the First Amendment
in post-Schall-Salerno decisions. In State v. Hughes,529 the Kansas Supreme Court
ruled a State of Kansas prohibition outlawing distribution of an "obscene device, 53 °
which formed the basis of charges lodged against the distributor of a vibrator kit
with a dildo attachment, violated constitutionally protected rights of privacy
guaranteed by due process and, as such, was determined to be "overbroad. ' 3 '
Conceding that "[t]he overbreadth doctrine generally has been held to apply only in
First Amendment contexts," the Hughes court stated, "Nevertheless, the overbreadth
doctrine has been applied by the United States Supreme Court where the operation
of a statute infringes on freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, where those
freedoms involve privacy rights and medical matters."532 Also, this court allowed the
defendant-distributor standing to challenge this statute that "impermissibly infringes
on the constitutional right of privacy in one's home and in one's doctor's or
533
therapist's office," where such is being recommended as sexual therapy.
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-

523. Compare Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 862 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citing
Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489), with Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489.
524. See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1553-54.
525. See id. at 1577.
526. See id. at 1577-78.
527. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
528. 846 F. Supp. at 862.
529. 792 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1990).
530. Id. at 1026-27 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214301 (1995)).
531. Id. at 1030-32.
532. Id. at 1030 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
533. Id. at 1032. CompareSewell v. State, 233 S.E. 2d 187, 188-89 (Ga. 1977) (ruling statute outlawing "any
device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs [because it] is obscene
material" neither overbroad nor vague).
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Five East Colfax, Inc., 5 3 4 had ruled in 1985 that distribution of an "obscene
device ' 535 was unconstitutional because it violated the right of privacy.536 Here, the
court determined that the distributor of such devices had standing to challenge these
restrictions that "sweep too broadly in their blanket proscription," which
impermissibly burdened the rights of those seeking to use such items for medical or
therapeutic purposes.5 37

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State v. Brenan,5 38 also evaluated
the constitutionality of legislation banning the "promotion of obscene devices. 539
The Louisiana Court of Appeals had determined the statute was "overly broad,"
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.- ° However, the
Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that overbreadth analysis was not appropriate
because the First Amendment was not involved.54' Thus, the court did not rely on
the overbreadth doctrine in their final determination that the statute was unconstitutional because the "right to speak" was not involved. 542 Also, they refused to find the
right to privacy extended to the use of these devices. Instead, the court concluded
that the enactment "bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest and
' 44
is, therefore, violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The court's refusal to apply overbreadth analysis in this case was supported by
previous determinations that "[o]verbreadth invalidations of statutes are generally
inappropriate when the allegedly impermissible applications of the challenged
statute affect conduct rather than speech. 5
Other lower court cases have grappled with the use of overbreadth in the area of
procedural rights. 5" These cases often acknowledge the U.S. Supreme Court's
assertion that overbreadth is limited to the First Amendment and then either
accept," reject," or simply ignore the Court in its application of overbreadth.549 In
In re Grand Jury Proceedings,55 the District Court for the District of Hawaii
reviewed the constitutionality of six grand jury subpoenas duces tecum that were
" ' The art
issued to Center Art Galleries in an investigation of alleged art fraud.55
gallery challenged the government's subpoenas based on numerous deficiencies, one
being that they were "unconstitutionally" overbroad in violation of the Fourth

534. 697 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1985).
535. Id. at 358-59 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-102(3) (1984)).
536. Id. at 370.
537. Id.
538. 772 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000).
539. Id. at 66-67 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1 (1986)).
540. Id. at 66 (quoting Russel v. State, 739 So. 2d 368, 369 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
541. Id. at 69 n.3 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984)).
542. Id.
543. Id. at 70-72.
544. Id. at 76.
545. Id. at 69 n.3 (citing State v. Greco, 583 So. 2d 825, 828-29 (La. 1991); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 614 (1973)).
546. See infra notes 549-569 and accompanying text.
547. See infra notes 549-554 and accompanying text.
548. See infra notes 566-569 and accompanying text.
549. See infra notes 555-559 and accompanying text.
550. 707 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Haw. 1989).
551. Id. at 1208-09.
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Amendment.55 2 The district court noted, "motions to quash can be granted on the
basis of unconstitutional overbreadth only if the government subpoenas are 'far too
sweeping in [their] terms to be regarded as reasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment., 553 Here, then, the district court quashed four of the subpoenas on the
basis of Fourth Amendment overbreadth." 4 In its ruling, the district court discussed
various other opinions that involved overbreadth claims in the subpoena context and
noted the lack of uniformity in decision making reflected in these rulings analyzing
Fourth Amendment overbreadth claims. 5
In the 1990 case of American Federationof Government Employees, AFL-CIO
v. Sullivan,556 plaintiffs, two employee unions, brought an action in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia for declaratory and injunctive relief from a
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) drug testing plan. 557 The plaintiffs
challenged sections of the HHS Drug-Free Workplace Plan as violating privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment. 55' The federal district court granted the
injunction and found that a section of the plan allowing "reasonable suspicion
testing" was "overbroad" and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.559 Specifically,
the district court noted, "The standard [in the HHS regulation] which provides for
reasonable suspicion testing based upon 'a pattern of abnormal conduct or erratic
behavior,' is both unduly broad and ambiguous., ' 560 These cases illustrate not only
the lower court's application of overbreadth in the context of privacy rights but also
reflect the confusion within the lower courts in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
declaration that the use of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to the First
Amendment.
In addition to the lower court cases in which the overbreadth doctrine is cited in
constitutional areas totally removed from the context of the free speech, there are
cases in which courts have examined an overbreadth attack on a statute's
constitutionality where the stricture reflects a hybrid nature, with one aspect
arguably triggering a First Amendment concern and other aspects clearly not
involving the First Amendment. While many of these cases take place in the
criminal context, they often involve offenses that have an element of the First
Amendment interwoven in them.5 6' For example, offenses that incriminate
"loitering," arguably activity that itself may be protected by the First Amendment
freedom of expression, are often aimed at curbing activities such as prostitution and
drug dealing, which are activities obviously not protected by the First

552. Id. at 1210-11.
553. Id. at 1215 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974) (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 76 (1906))).
554. Id. at 1219.
555. Id. at 1215-16.
556. 744 F. Supp. 294 (D.D.C. 1990).
557. Id. at 296.
558. Id.
559. Id. at 304.
560. Id.
561. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Wash. 1992) ("First Amendment activities
are implicated by the Tacoma drug loitering ordinance, including freedom of expressive association and freedom
of movement.") (citing Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)).
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Amendment.562 How a defendant packages his arguments and, of course, the
reviewing court's predilection may affect the outcome. 63 Thus, in some cases, a
defendant could be attacking a criminal statute as overbroad, but the claim will fail
because of the court's refusal to find that the stricture steps on any fundamental
right.5 Also, if the loitering statute under review requires specific intent to engage
in criminal behavior or overt, illegal acts, the law will likely be considered outside
the reach of the First Amendment.565
Finally, it is significant that at least one state supreme court has had occasion to
dig into the state's constitution and find it demands a wider view of overbreadth.56 6
The Colorado Supreme Court, in People v. Shepard,567 noted, "In Colorado, we have
extended [the] rule of standing to raise third party claims on a facial challenge from
the First Amendment to all fundamental constitutional rights. 568 Although it pointed
out that Colorado's Constitution is "more protective of certain rights of privacy than
the Fourth Amendment,, 569 it was unconvinced that the state's wiretapping statute's
potential reach on constitutionally protected conduct was "real and substantial..."
and, as such, the overbreadth claim based on the state's constitutional protection was
rejected.57 °
VI. CLOSING ARGUMENT
A. Life without Schall-Salerno: An Illustration
Let us return to my earlier hypothetical.57 ' Assume Citizen has the misfortune of
being confronted by each of the new Enactments. Citizen violates Enactment A by
expressing support for a particular foreign government's condemnation of American
military policy in the Mideast. State authorities are determined to make an example
out of Citizen in order to discourage further criticism of American military policy
by citizens of the state. Under the authority of Enactment B, state law enforcement
agents inform Citizen of their intention to place Citizen and all members of his
family under "heavy surveillance" and periodically search his home without a
warrant. Meanwhile, Citizen is subpoenaed before a state grand jury and asked
numerous questions about his past, including whether he ever smoked marijuana in
college. Citizen knows that, if he answers the question truthfully, he could be
opening himself up to criminal liability. However, he is advised that Enactment C

562. See Robert C. McConkey, "Camping Ordinances" and the Homeless: Constitutional and Moral Issues
Raised by Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Public Areas, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 633, 654-56 (1996) (stating that
overbreadth issue should be rejected because the camping ordinances outlawing camping in public places are not
overbroad).
563. See, e.g., Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374 (holding Tacoma drug loitering ordinance violative of the First
Amendment, including the freedom of expressive association and freedom of movement).
564. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999).
565. See, e.g., Luvene, 827 P.2d at 1380-84 (upholding drug loitering ordinance); City of Seattle v. Slack,
784 P.2d 494, 496-97 (Wash. 1989) (upholding prostitution loitering ordinance).
566. People v. Shepard, 983 P.2d I (Colo. 1999).
567. Id.
568. Id. at 3 n.3 (citing Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803, 807 (Colo. 1992)).
569. Id. at 5 (citing COLO. CONST. art. I, § 7).
570. Id. at 3-4.
571. See supra Part 1.
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requires a response to all grand jury questions, whether his response will incriminate
him or not, and his failure to answer any question will be followed by a contempt
citation. Citizen refuses to answer. Citizen is found in contempt of court and ordered
to jail. Citizen learns he has been indicted for violation of the state prohibition
against treason and will be tried in a closed tribunal without the benefit of a jury as
provided by Enactment D. He is also informed that it is the intention of the state to
seek the death penalty as authorized by Enactment E.
Assume further that Citizen is your brother. You visit Citizen in jail. While an
armed guard monitors your conversation with Citizen, Citizen tells you he is "scared
to death" for the safety of his wife and children. He states that he does not wish to
personally challenge any of these enactments in court for fear of reprisal against his
family. To complicate matters, you believe Citizen now suffers from severe
paranoia. You consult with counsel from the state's Civil Liberties Union. Counsel
informs you that a declaratory judgment based on facial invalidity as well as an
injunction against enforcement of each Enactment is possible if (1) it can be
established that each Enactment is invalid because each "is unconstitutional in every
conceivable application ' 572 or (2)"because it seeks to prohibit such a broad range
of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally 'overbroad.'" 573 Counsel surmises
that the various Enactments will not be successfully challenged on the theory that
"every conceivable application" would invariably prove unconstitutional because
at least some, if not all, of the Enactments might be legitimately employed against
a suspected foreign terrorist found in the state. Thus, counsel turns to the
overbreadth doctrine. Counsel observes that, when weighed against the
constitutional guarantees of citizens of the state (who enjoy all fundamental rights)
and the "other persons" contemplated by each Enactment (who may not), one would
have little difficulty asserting each Enactment's overly broad reach is "not only
real.. .but substantialas well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep. '57 4 Now, the only question that remains is whether the overbreadth doctrine
is the sole province of the First Amendment or, instead, a protector of every
constitutional right. If counsel is compelled to report that the state's courts
stubbornly adhere to the Schall-Salerno approach, you, as Citizen's next of kin,
might succeed in invalidating Enactment A, but not B, C, D, or E. If, however, the
state adopts the broad view of overbreadth advocated by this author, you may also
effectively vindicate Citizen's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment right to
be free of each of the draconian Enactments, even if Citizen is too timid or paranoid
when threatened by an oppressive government to do so himself.
Professor Monaghan' s observation before the Schall-Salernopronouncement was
correct in asserting that "a litigant has always the right to be judged in accordance
with a constitutionally valid rule of law. 575 Moreover, as noted earlier,576 this author
believes every citizen's conduct and rights must be measured by a valid rule of law.
To assure vindication of not only one's personal rights but also the rights of others

572.
573.
574.
575.
576.

Members of City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984).
Id.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (emphasis added).
Monaghan, supra note 11, at 3.
See supra note 11.
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whose rights are substantially threatened but whose condition or circumstance does
not permit their personal challenge, an overbreadth doctrine that reaches the
contours of all fundamental rights is a necessity. Requiring an enactment to have a
chilling effect on speech,577 or even one's ability to procure an abortion578 or some
other fundamental right, before the overbreadth doctrine is allowed to show its head,
misses an essential point. Human conditions or circumstances-indigence,
ignorance, illness, disability, immaturity, old age, imprisonment, isolation, timidity,
fear, and the like-often prevent a patently unconstitutional law from being
challenged by one directly affected by the law.579 Third-party standing is the
prophylactic that vindicates the rights of those not before the court. 580 Simply put,
the prophylactic minimizes application of enactments that do not measure up to a
constitutionally valid rule of law but instead impede exercise of fundamental rights
to a substantial degree.
Further, a broad view of overbreadth should not be interpreted as leading to the
destruction of traditional standing. Broadrick'sdemand for "substantial" overreach
before the doctrine is triggered is one possible way to protect the standing
requirement.581 Casey's condition that the statute amounts to a "substantial obstacle"
to the exercise of a fundamental right in a "large fraction of the cases" is another,
which may be nothing more than another way to say the same thing. 58 Lest the test
for employment of the overbreadth doctrine be attacked as so lenient that it will
allow the exception to swallow the rule, the author would borrow from (1) Secretary
of State ofMarylandv. Munson,5 83 which indicates that, where "practical obstacles"
prevent a person from asserting their own rights, a third party who has some type of
"injury-in-fact to satisfy the [Article] I case-or-controversy requirement" is
allowed to vindicate the rights of the person most directly affected by the overbroad
law 5" and (2) Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Vincent, 585 which
defines "substantial overbreadth" as arising where there exists a "realistic danger"
that a law will "significantly compromise" fundamental rights of persons "not before
'
the Court."586
Thus, where (1) a significant obstacle prevents a person from
vindicating their own rights, (2) a third-party has suffered some type of injury-infact, and (3) a realistic danger exists that a substantially overbroad law will

577. Sec'y of State of Md. v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984).
578. See Dorf, supra note 11, at 265-71.
579. The inability of many persons to fend for themselves was vividly explained in Matthew's writings in
the Bible, when he discusses the "Final Judgment" and how the "King" assesses whether humankind have properly
supported one another:
Then the King will say to the people on his right, "Come, you that are blessed by my Father!
Come and possess the kingdom which has been prepared for you ever since the creation of the
world. I was hungry and you fed me, thirsty and you gave me a drink; I was a stranger and you
received me in your homes, naked and clothed me; I was sick and you took care of me, in prison
and you visited me."
Matthew 25:34-37 (Good News Bible).
580. Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601.
581. Id. at 615.
582. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
583. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
584. Id. at 956 (discussing right to privacy and abortion).
585. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
586. Id. at 800 (discussing First Amendment).

Winter 2004]

OVERBREADTH

significantly compromise a fundamental right of the person not before the court, a
court has the power, as a prudential matter, to allow a third party who "can
reasonably be expected properly to frame the issues and present them with the
necessary adversarial zeal"5" 7 to proceed and, if warranted, facially invalidate the
substantially overbroad enactment.
Here, you, as Citizen's next of kin, could point to the following: (1) Citizen's
incarceration, his fear for his family, and his mental instability; (2) the immediate
family relationship with Citizen as well as the fear of facing the wrath of Enactments
A through E personally;"' and (3) the reality that Citizen's basic constitutional
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments are being trampled by
actual application of the various enactments against him. Citizen's rights would be
vindicated unless, of course, Schall-Salernois alive and well.
B. A Pleafor a Common Sense Approach to Overbreadth
Overbreadth should not be limited to the First Amendment arena. Instead, it
should be recognized in other areas as well. Overbreadth is a doctrine that has
historical roots in various fields of constitutional law.589 Moreover, allowing it to
have life beyond free speech makes good judicial sense. There is no reason to limit
such an important and powerful tool to a certain area only because that is where it
originated. The Schall-Salerno dichotomy that distinguishes between those claims
that are worthy of overbreadth consideration (ones based on First Amendment free
speech) 590 and those that are not worthy (other fundamental rights)591 smacks of
judicial reliance on a distinction without a principled difference. A statute that
substantially erodes any constitutionally protected activity because its language is
not more narrowly tailored should be struck down. Only recently, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Lawrence v. Texas 592 ruled that a Texas statute that outlawed persons of the
same sex from engaging in certain intimate sexual conduct 593 "further[ed] no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual" and, as such, was violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 94 Although Lawrence involved a challenge to such
595
legislation by two individuals who had been arrested for violation of this stricture
and, consequently, was not challenged on overbreadth grounds, the overbreadth

587. Munson, 467 U.S. at 956.
588. Injury-in-fact does not mean that you have to be someone's relative in order to meet this test. It means
that you have to fear application of the unconstitutional law to you personally or someone else, which application
will affect the petitioner as well in some significant fashion, such as economically.
589. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (protecting parental rights); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704 (1987) (protecting property rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting freedom of choice and right
to privacy); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (protecting the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (protecting the right to travel).
590. See Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (considering overbreadth claims based on First
Amendment free speech).
591. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (considering freedom of choice and right of privacy).
592. 539 U.S. 558; 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
593. Id. at 516, 123 S.Ct. at 2476 (citing TEX.PENALCODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003)).
594. Id. at 525, 123 S.Ct, at 2484. The charges were lodged against two adult males who were engaging in
a consensual sexual encounter in the privacy of a home.
595. Id. at 517, 123 S.Ct. at 2477.
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doctrine gives courts the additional ability to invalidate this type of overreaching
enactment, where practical obstacles prevent a party from asserting rights on behalf
of itself.
While this is a call for the overbreadth doctrine to be extended, it is not a call for
overbreadth to be casually employed. Overbreadth is indeed "strong medicine" that
should be administered only in necessary cases.596 However, our nation's courts
have the capacity to find a balance between applying it when needed and overusing
it.
Is the First Amendment more important than other rights? Or more important to
the degree that it demands its own doctrines and protection of its rights? Most would
argue that it is. When citizens think about the most important freedoms and the
rights they most cherish, the First Amendment immediately comes to mind. After
all, the rights enshrined in the First Amendment are those that permit a democracy
to flourish. But the issue of overbreadth outside the First Amendment context need
not be entangled with the importance of the First Amendment and how it compares
vis-A-vis other rights. Instead, one should consider the importance and value of the
overbreadth doctrine and how a doctrine of its magnitude should not be limited to
one specific context.
The Court should focus on the question of overbreadth from the standpoint of the
benefits of the overbreadth doctrine and the protection of other rights enshrined in
the Constitution, rather than limiting itself to the applying the doctrine in cases
involving the First Amendment. Extending the overbreadth doctrine to other
contexts would generate consistency and better protect the rights of citizens.597 This
should include procedural as well as substantive rights. For example, if draconian
legislation completely abrogated Fourth Amendment rights to be free of an
unreasonable search or seizure in one context or eliminated the right to a public trial
in another, the courts should use all of their judicial powers to address this invalid
area of law.
The law and the legal field constantly evolve. While stare decisis is necessary to
generate consistent outcomes and apply the law fairly to all, ideas and doctrines
evolve over time, reflecting a changing society and changing ideals.598 If one
examines the caselaw reviewed above, it is impossible to ignore the fact that there
is some vitality to overbreadth outside the First Amendment context. Thus, the
proposition that the doctrine should be extended is not something that would require
developing law out of thin air. Any accusation that overbreadth is totally lacking of
precedent beyond the First Amendment would be off the mark because there already
exists a sound, albeit slim, base of overbreadth decisions for courts to build upon.
Admittedly, it is impossible to ignore the explicit language cited in various cases
that proclaim, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited

596. Broadrick v.Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
597. See Ford, supra note 370, at 1451 (noting that "[i]f the Court had been using a Salerno no-set-ofcircumstances test in these cases, it would have been forced to uphold [most of] the statutes. Even the most
restrictive abortion laws, after all, can be applied constitutionally to a woman in the post-viability stage of her
pregnancy and not facing a grave threat to her health").
598. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
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' Often these points go unchallenged by others
context of the First Amendment."599
not in the majority opinion, adding fuel to the contention that, indeed, no
However, as the
overbreadth doctrine exists outside the First Amendment.'
thorough analysis of the several cases that were decided during the Warren era and
the majority of the Burger and Rehnquist Court's abortion jurisprudence above
illustrates, one must recognize that an overbreadth doctrine enjoys life outside the
First Amendment.6 1
There is no compelling reason 2 why the doctrine should be limited solely to
First Amendment rights. An overbreadth doctrine beyond the First Amendment60is3
needed for the same reasons it was needed inside the First Amendment context.
The benefits of third-party standing, which is at the heart of overbreadth, should not
be monopolized by the First Amendment. Most importantly, overbreadth analysis
clearly advances the interest of insisting that the conduct and rights of all persons
be squared with a valid rule of law, a concept that should apply equally to all
fundamental rights; therefore, these other constitutional rights should be afforded
the same.

599. Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
600. See, e.g., id.
601. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (protecting parental rights); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704 (1987) (protecting property rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting freedom of choice and right
to privacy); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (protecting the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (protecting the right to travel).
602. After all, the technical reason that the First Amendment is where the doctrine originated is not a
compelling reason.
603. These reasons were to protect the citizenry from being discouraged in fully exercising each and every
constitutional right without fear of reprisal.

